THEOLOGY

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EDITORIAL

DURING Lent special courses of Sunday sermons and weekday addresses are being provided in many, perhaps most, churches throughout the land. It is therefore a suitable time in which to consider the state of preaching in the Church. Its present state is commonly deplored, but often on wrong grounds, so that many of the complaints can plausibly be made to rebound on those who advance them. For example, it is salutary to point out to hypercritical and censorious hearers that devout and humble souls can derive edification or instruction from the most casual discourse; but preaching surely needs to be addressed to men who are naturally neither devout nor humble. Again, it is true that complaints about sermons are by no means peculiar to this age, but that is not a reason for declining to take present complaints seriously. It is not difficult for those who are widely read to produce from almost any preceding period almost identical denunciations of this as of other evils. There have always been evils enough and to spare both in the world and in the Church, and there has seldom been a lack of persons to name, if not to remedy, them. Citations from the past must not be used as a way of evading the criticism and correction of our own evils, which anyhow are never precisely the same as those of other days. Nor, again, is the evil of bad or ineffective preaching to be dismissed with the pleasant aphorism of the Venerable Archdeacon Paley, who said that he knew nothing against someone "but that he was a popular preacher." It is not the popularity of preaching which is in question but its power.

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The unhappy consequence of the Anglican sacramental and ceremonial revival in the unintended depreciation of the importance of preaching—by exalting the sacredness of the altar far above the sacredness of the pulpit—is now

frequently acknowledged, at least on paper.[1] It is less evident that the balance is being redressed in the actual witness and worship of the Church. We have called attention before to the comparative neglect in Anglican theological colleges of sustained preparation for the task of preaching. What is needed is not only closer attention to the technique of sermon-construction and to the art of elocution; we apprehend that those matters are less neglected than they were. The basic need is for a renewed grasp in the Church as a whole, and therefore by the ministry in particular, of the place and purpose of preaching in God's plan for the redemption of the world. Recent theological books contain frequent allusions to *kerygma*—proclamation—as a leading concept in the New Testament; "realized eschatology" has become almost a *cliché* in the lecture room. But this recovery or this new discovery (one-sided as it may be) has not yet affected what you are likely to hear from the pulpit of your parish church next Sunday so much as might have been hoped. Nevertheless, we believe that there is an increasing number of parish priests who are gravely embarrassed by the apparent absence of close connexion between the kind of sermons that they have been accustomed to preach and, for instance, the works on New Testament theology which they are now not only being urged to read but are in fact reading with interest and even with excitement.

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To such Dr Herbert Farmer's book, *The Servant of the Word* (Nisbet, 6s.), will make an instant appeal. Not that it should appeal to the clergy only, for, as he says, preaching is by no means the exclusive responsibility of those who make and deliver sermons; theirs is "a specialised function within the total life, the work and witness and worship, of the Christian community as a whole" (p. v). The freshness of his approach to the subject is largely due to the use that he has made of the profound ideas contained in Martin Buber's *I and Thou*.[2] He starts from the proposition that

[1] *E.g.*, see the candid observations of the Bishop of Bath and Wells in *Northern Catholicism*, ed. by N. P. Williams and C. Harris (1933), pp. 295 *ff.* [2] Eng. trans. by R. Gregor Smith (T. and T. Clark, 2s. 6d.); we agree with Dr Oldham that this book has hardly yet begun to be recognized in this country at its true worth (*Christian News-Letter*, Supplement, No. 112). See also John Baillie, *Our Knowledge of God*, ch. v.

God has so made us that " He never enters into *personal* relationship with a man apart from other human persons " (p. 37), and draws out its implications. We can here call attention to only one or two points, and must urge our readers to study the book for themselves.

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Christian preaching cannot be understood according to the general principles governing propaganda; it is not merely a means of conveying the content of the Christian faith. It is *sui generis* because it is itself a part of the saving activity of God to which it witnesses. God's saving activity is always an *I–Thou* relationship, and speech is the characteristic means of communication between persons. God therefore approaches and addresses men and women " always through other persons, or, more generally, through history which is the sphere of persons in relationship " (p. 56). Preaching is thus seen to be the personal encounter of God with human persons through their relations with other human persons. " If a man is to be saved he must be confronted again and again with the givenness of Christ " (p. 86), and it is in the act of preaching, in which both preachers and hearers are to be equally and personally active, that God wills this confrontation to occur.

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This may sound dangerously abstract, and indeed it is so unless it points to something which really can happen and does happen. Better books about preaching are worthless except in so far as they are helps to better preaching. Dr Farmer is keenly alive both to " the need for concreteness " and to the bewildering gap that there appears to be between the unchanging gospel and " the contemporary mind "; these are the actual titles of his final chapters. Because preaching is part of a system of personal relationships, it is conditioned by the knowledge and the care that preacher and hearer have of each other. For this reason the best preacher is normally the best pastor, and *vice versa*. Dr Farmer might have used as an illustration the little boy who, after being taken to hear Spurgeon preach, asked: " Mummy, why did that man speak to *me* all the time ?" And if you read Spurgeon's sermons to-day, you can still feel how, in spite of the number of casual visitors who must have sat under him, he established a personal connexion with each of his hearers and among them all.

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At the same time Dr Farmer emphasizes that the old forms of "personal evangelism" are played out. He even exaggerates this fact. But the exaggeration is pardonable. For men and women to-day—at least those who are most likely to attend to authentic Christian preaching—are socially and politically and historically conscious in a way that they have not been before. "The gospel has got to have an unmistakable cosmic note in it, a note of community" (p. 126). As to how this note may be struck, as to how the middle wall of partition, which at present separates the unchanging gospel and those who are eagerly listening for it but as yet cannot hear it, may be broken down, Dr Farmer has some suggestive things to say. But this predicament, as he very well knows, cannot be resolved in books, but only in act, in the place where God meets men in personal encounter, where His demand and succour are made known to a particular congregation, at a particular time, in terms of their particular needs and opportunities.

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We hope that we have said enough to show how important is the theme of this book for all Christians, and especially for Anglicans. On this subject, at all events, we need have no scruples in sitting at the feet of a Presbyterian divine. He would not be human if he did not occasionally exaggerate his distinctive message. He is himself a little too free in a use of adjectives which in one passage (p. 61) he ruthlessly and on the whole wisely condemns. One or two remarks betray the gaping astonishment of an external observer of Catholic worship; a more sympathetic discernment would have modified these. But by and large his thrusts strike home, not least because they have manifestly struck home to the writer himself first of all.

Philosophy and Theology

PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY is the unusual name of the chair I represent. It is the name which suits me better than any other, since the centre of my thought and work is on the boundary line between philosophy and theology. But has the title Philosophical Theology more than a personal meaning? Has it an objective meaning? Is it a justified combination of words?

Some will give a decidedly negative answer to this question. Theological supranaturalism of Continental as well as American types will denounce philosophical theology as a contradiction in terms or, even more, as high treason against theology. On the other hand philosophers and theological humanists may denounce philosophical theology —although perhaps with less fanaticism than the opposite group—as an impure mixture of two incompatible methods of thought. They may admit the right of dealing philosophically with religion as with any other subject. But philosophy of religion is not philosophical theology. Can our name be defended against this double attack?

The answer is implied in the answer to the old question of the relation between philosophy and theology. After at least two thousand years of thought dedicated to the solution of this problem, it is not easy to offer a new solution. Nevertheless it must be tried in every generation as long as theology exists. For the question of the relation of philosophy and theology is the question of the nature of theology itself.

The term philosophical theology points to a theology which has philosophical character. What does this mean? First of all: It implies that there is a theology which has *not* a philosophical but some other character. This, indeed, is the case. As long as theological thought has existed there have been two types of theology, a philosophical one and—let me call it—a " kerygmatic " one. Kerygmatic is derived from the New Testament word *kerygma*, message. It is a theology which tries to reproduce the content of the Christian message in an ordered and systematic way, without referring to philosophy. In contrast to it, philosophical theology, although based on the same kerygma, tries to explain the contents of the kerygma in keen inter-

relation with philosophy. The tension and mutual fertilization between these two types is a main event and a fortunate one in all history of Christian thought. The fight of the traditionalists of the Early Church against the rising Logos-Christology, the struggle between the mystics and dialecticians in the early Middle Ages, between biblicism and scholasticism in the later Middle Ages, between the Reformers and the Aristotelian scholastics, the attack of the Ritschlians on speculative theology, and of the Barthians on a Philosophy of Religion—all this and much more was the consequence of the existence of a philosophical and a kerygmatic theology. The duality is natural. It is implied in the very word theology, the syllable " theo " pointing to the kerygma, in which God is revealed, and the syllable " logy " pointing to the endeavour of human reason to receive the message. This implies further that kerygmatic and philosophical theology demand each other and are wrong in the moment in which they become exclusive. No kerygmatic theology ever existed which did not use philosophical terms and methods. And no philosophical theology ever existed—deserving the name theology—which did not try to explain the content of the message. Therefore the theological ideal is the complete unity of both types, an ideal which is reached only by the greatest theologians and even by them only approximately. The fact that every human creativity has its typological limitations makes it desirable that theological faculties should include a representative of kerygmatic and one of philosophical theology, whether the latter is called apologetics, speculative theology, Christian philosophy of religion, or philosophical theology. The Church cannot do without this type as, of course, it cannot dispense with the kerygmatic type.

It is not my task to enlarge on the nature of kerygmatic theology. The most radical attempt to create a purely kerygmatic theology in our period is made by Karl Barth. But he, in contrast to some of his fanatical pupils, is honest enough to acknowledge that he cannot avoid philosophical language and methods completely, since even our daily life language is shaped by philosophical terminology and philosophical ways of thought. Neither is it my task to deal with the difficult question as to whether there is a third type—namely, mystical theology—as has often been suggested; or whether mysticism, as I should prefer to say,

is an element of any religious message and therefore a substantial element in both types of theology.

Now, what is the relation of philosophy and theology and consequently the exact meaning of "philosophical theology"? In order to answer this question, as far as it can be answered at all, we must try to traverse some difficult ways of abstract thought for which I must beg the reader's patience.

Philosophy asks the ultimate question that can be asked—namely, the question as to what being, simply being, means. Whatever the object of thought may be, it is always something that *is* and not *not* is. But what does the word "is" mean? What is the meaning of being? Santayana, in a very fine analysis of experience, derives all experience from shocks we receive and which disturb the smooth flux of our intuition. I think he is right. And his insight should be used not only for the sake of stopping the vague and detrimental use of the word experience which we find in popular philosophy and theology, but also for a more profound, more Aristotelian description of the experience of which philosophy is born. It is the philosophical shock, the tremendous impetus of the question: What is the meaning of being? Why is there being and not not being? What is the character in which every being participates? Questions like these may be late in their explicit and rational form, although they underlie the most mythological creations. In any case they are essentially human. For man, as the German philosopher Heidegger says, is that being which asks what being is. This question and the shock with which it takes hold of us is especially human. It is the foundation of humanism and the root of philosophy. For philosophy asks the question for being itself. This implies that philosophy primarily does not ask for the special character of the beings, the things and events, the ideas and values, the souls and bodies which share being. Philosophy asks what about this being itself. Therefore all philosophers have developed a "first philosophy," as Aristotle calls it—namely, an interpretation of being. And from this they go on to the description of the different classes of beings and to the system of their independence, the world. It is easy to make a simple division between philosophy and theology, if philosophy deals only with the second realm, with sciences and attempts to unite their last results in a picture of the world. But philosophy,

before trying a description of the world in unity with all kinds of scientific and non-scientific experience, tries to understand being itself and the categories and structures which are common to all kinds of beings. This makes the division between philosophy and theology impossible. For whatever the relation of God, world and man may be, it lies in the frame of being; and any interpretation of the meaning and structure of being as being unavoidably has consequences for the interpretation of God, man and the world in their interrelations.

This concept of philosophy may be challenged from different sides. The establishment of a first philosophy may be attacked with the popular argument that it entails a return to old-fashioned metaphysics. The presupposition of this argument is the magic of the prefix " meta " in metaphysics which, in spite of the testimony of all textbooks and lectures on philosophy that it means the book after the physics in the collection of Aristotelian writings, has received the meaning of something beyond human experience, open to arbitrary imagination. But the question of being, the question of a first or fundamental philosophy, is the question of what is nearer to us than anything else; it is we ourselves as far as we *are*, and at the same time as human beings are able to ask what it means that we are. It is time to dismiss this abused and distorted word " metaphysics," the negation of which has become an excuse for a terrific shallowness of thought in comparison with which primitive mythology was extremely profound.

Another criticism may come from the claim of epistemology to be the true first philosophy. I would admit that this claim is justified to a great extent. Parmenides, the first and greatest of the ontologists, knew that being and the logos of being—that is, the rational word which grasps being—belong together; or, as we should say, that being is always subjective and objective at the same time. Epistemology is wrong only if it pretends to exist without an ontological basis. It cannot do so. And this insight has caused the breakdown of the epistemological period of philosophy in the last decades. You cannot have appearance without a being that appears, or knowledge without a being that is known, or experience without a being that is experienced. Otherwise appearance and experience become only other words for being, and the problem of being is only stated in different terms.

There is a third criticism we have to face. It may be said that there is no approach for man to the structure and meaning of being, that what being is is revealed to us in the manifoldness of beings and in the world in which they all are united and interrelated to each other. It could be said: Look at minerals and flowers, look at animals and men, look at history and arts, and you will learn what being is, but do not ask for being itself above all of them. To this we must answer: You cannot prohibit man from asking the most human question, no dictator can do so even if he appears in the gown of humble positivism or modest empiricism. Man is more than apparatus for registering so-called facts and their interdependence. He wants to *know*, to know about himself as thrown into being, to know about the powers and structures controlling this being in himself and in his world. He wants to know the meaning of being because he is man and not only an epistemological subject. Therefore he transcends and always must transcend the "No trespassing" signs, cautiously built by scepticism and dogmatically guarded by pragmatism. The meaning of being is his basic concern, is the really human and philosophical question.

But this statement brings us to the turning point—to the point, namely, in which philosophy shows a kerygmatic and therefore theological character. For this is the task of theology: To ask for being as far as it gives us ultimate concern. Theology deals with what concerns us inescapably, ultimately, unconditionally. It deals with it not as far as it *is* but as far as it is for *us*. In no theological statement can the relation to us be omitted. Without the element of ultimate concern no assertion is a theological one. As a theologian you can speak and you must speak about everything between heaven and earth—and beyond heaven and earth. But you speak of it theologically only if you show how it belongs to our final concern, to that which decides about our being or not being in the sense of our eternal, ultimate meaning and destiny. This is the truth in the much misunderstood assertion that theology is a practical discipline. If practical is understood in contrast to theoretical, that statement is entirely wrong, since truth is an essential element in what concerns us ultimately. If practical means that theology must deal with its subject always as far as it concerns us in the very depth of our being, theology is practical. But since by popular distortion

the word practical has received an anti-theoretical flavour, and since the Ritschlian school created that definition of theology in order to cut off theology from philosophy, sacrificing truth to morals, it is more adequate to use another form—for instance, to use with Søren Kierkegaard the word " existential." Existential is what characterizes our real existence in all its concreteness, in all its accidental elements, in its freedom and responsibility, in its failure and separation from its true and essential being. Theology thinks on the basis of this existential situation and in continuous relation to it. Asking for the meaning of being, theology asks for the ultimate ground and power and norm and aim of being as far as it is *my* being and carries *me* as the abyss and ground of my existence, for the threatening and promising power over my existence, for the demanding and judging norm of my existence, for the fulfilling and rejecting aim of my existence. In other words: Asking for the meaning of being, theology asks for God. Asking for the powers and structures constituting the being of self and the world, their interrelation and their manifoldness, theology asks for the appearance of the ground, power, norm and aim of being in these realms of being. It asks for the way in which man receives or resists the appearance of his ultimate concern. It asks for the way in which nature reveals or hides what concerns us ultimately. It asks for the relation of what concerns us historically to what concerns us ultimately. In other words, it asks for the divine and demonic powers in ourselves, in our world, in nature as well as in history. This is existential thinking; this is theology. But now we have reached again a turning point, this time the point in which theology shows its philosophical character. Dealing with the meaning of being as far as it concerns us ultimately, dealing with man and the world, with nature and history as far as our ultimate concern appears in them, we must know the meaning of being, we must know the structures and powers controlling the different realms of existence.

We have searched for the object or question of philosophy and we have discovered that a theological element, an ultimate concern, gives the impulse to philosophy. We have searched for the object or question of theology and we have discovered that a philosophical element is implied in theology—the question of the meaning and structure of being and its manifestation in the different realms of being.

Philosophy and theology are divergent as well as convergent. They are convergent as far as both are existential and theoretical at the same time. They are divergent as far as philosophy is basically theoretical and theology is basically existential. This is the reason that philosophy is able to neglect its existential basis and to deal with being and beings as if they did not concern us at all. And this is the reason that theology is able to neglect its theoretical form and to become simply kerygma. But as theology always has created a philosophical theology, so philosophers always have tried to reach existential significance, to give a prophetic message, to found a sect, to start a religious-political movement or to become mystics. But in doing so they were philosophical theologians and were considered as such by followers and foes. Most creative philosophers were theological in this sense. Only non-creative philosophy cuts itself off entirely from its existential basis. It has in its hands the shells, not the substance, of philosophy. It is school and not life and therefore not philosophy, but the trading of old philosophical merchandise.

Both philosophy and theology become poor and distorted when they are separated from each other. Philosophy becomes logical positivism, prohibiting philosophy from dealing with any problem which concerns us seriously—political, anthropological, religious—a very comfortable flight of philosophical thought from the tremendous realities of our period. Or it becomes mere epistemology, sharpening always the knife of thought, but never cutting, because cutting toward a truth which concerns us demands venturing courage and passion. Or it becomes history of philosophy, enumerating the philosophical opinions of the past one after another, keeping itself at a noble distance, faithlessly and cynically, a philosophy without existential basis, without theological ground and power. In the same way theology, denying entirely its philosophical concern, becomes as poor and distorted as philosophy without a theological impulse. Such a theology speaks of God as of being besides others, subject to the structure of being as all beings are, stars and men and animals, the highest being but not being itself, not the meaning of being and therefore a merciful tyrant limited in power, who may concern us very much, but not ultimately, not unconditionally, whose existence, doubtful as it is, must be argued for as for the existence of a new chemical or a disputable event in past history. Or such

a theology separates man from nature and nature from man, the self from its world and the world from the self to which it belongs. It must do so because it does not know of the powers and structures of being which control man *and* nature, the world *and* the self, subjecting both to tragedy and working in both for fulfilment. The unity of being between man and nature is more basic than their difference in consciousness and freedom. A theology which is unable to understand this necessarily oscillates between moralism and naturalism. But being is more than nature and more than morals.

All this is not supposed to be a challenge to a genuine and consistent kerygmatic theology. It is said only against a theology which is not kerygmatic enough to restrict itself from the use of a shallow popular philosophy, or which is not philosophical enough to accept the fundamental concepts of a serious first philosophy.

We have found a convergence and divergence between theology and philosophy with respect to the question asked by both of them. There is another convergence and divergence with respect to the way the question is answered by both of them. The meaning of being manifests itself in the logos of being—that is, in the rational word which grasps and embraces being and in which being overcomes its hiddenness, its darkness, and becomes truth and light. Truth in Greek is *aletheia*: what is not hidden. Being ceases to be hidden in the word, the logos, the rational form through which it is meaningful and understandable. Being and the word in which it is conceived cannot be separated. Therefore wherever beings are, is logos of being, a form and structure in which its meaning is manifest. But although logos is in every being, it is outspoken only in that being which has the word, the rational word, the word of truth and light—that is, in man. In man the meaning of being can become manifest because man has the word revealing the hiddenness of being. But although every man has the word of truth potentially, not every man has it actually and no man has it perfectly. Therefore philosophy asks for the way in which man can find the revealing word, the logos of being. Only in a vision a few elect can find it, Parmenides answers. Only noble aristocratic souls are able to look into the infinite depth of the soul, Heraclitus indicates. Only he who is guided by a blessed demon can make the right decisions, Socrates

confesses. Only for the initiated the idea appears and the darkness of the cave in which human reason is enclosed disappears, Plato prophesies through the mouth of Diotima. Only those who are free citizens can reach the happiness of pure intuition, Aristotle admits. Only a few wise men reach the state of reason in which the logos of being can reveal itself, the Stoics pronounce. Only in one man—the Christian philosophers continue—the logos has appeared completely, full of grace and truth. This is the point in which the convergence of philosophy and theology is most powerful. It was a theological impulse which drove all these philosophers to a statement about the concrete situation in which the logos of being can appear. An existential concern is involved in all those limiting assertions. And, on the other hand, it is a philosophical concept in which the theology of logos expresses its unconditional concern about the message of Christ. Therefore philosophical theology is and must be logos-theology, while an exclusively kerygmatic theology, like that of Barth, denies the logos-doctrine.

I stopped naming philosophers who have asked the question as to the place where the logos of beings is manifest. I could continue up to the present. For the medieval philosophers, the Christian Church is the only place where the logos appears at its very centre. For the mystics from Plotinus to Spinoza, and for all mystics in India, it is the mystical and ascetic elevation over all beings in which the logos of being itself appears. For the philosophers of the modern Enlightenment in all European countries, it is the third and final period of history only, in which the educated and well-balanced man has grown mature for reason. For Fichte blessed life only, and for Hegel the fulfilment of history only, guarantee truth. For Marx it is the participation in the proletarian struggle and the victory in this struggle in which mere ideology is overcome by truth. In all these men, especially Marx, the question of the place in which the logos of being appears is taken seriously. In all of them theological passion, existential asking, is obvious. Against this cloud of philosophical witnesses, those school and textbook philosophers who pretend that philosophy is merely a matter of learning and intelligence vanish into complete insignificance, even if they constitute a larger number than those mentioned. There is no philosophy deserving the name without transformation of the human

existence of the philosopher, without his ultimate concern and without his faith in his election for truth in the place to which he belongs.

But here also the divergence must be stated: Philosophy, although knowing the existential presuppositions of truth, does not abide with them. It turns immediately to the content and tries to grasp it directly. In its systems it abstracts from the existential situation out of which they are born. It does not acknowledge any bondage to special traditions or authorities. It transcends them in asking for being itself beyond all singular beings, even the highest, even the asker himself. Philosophy asks on the existential basis of the Greek city-state and the religion of Apollo and Dionysius; but it asks for truth itself and may be persecuted by them. Philosophy asks on the existential and concrete basis of the Medieval Church and civilization. But it asks for the truth itself and may become martyred by them. Philosophy asks on the existential and concrete basis of bourgeois or proletarian society and culture. But it asks for truth itself and may be expelled by them. Philosophy in spite of its existential and concrete basis turns directly to the meaning of being. This is its freedom, and this brings it about that a thinker who intentionally subjects himself to ecclesiastical or national or class bondage ceases to be a philosopher.

Quite differently, the theologian is bound to the concrete and existential situation in which he finds himself and which is not only the basis but also the subject of his work. As a theologian he is bound to the appearance of the logos after he has acknowledged its appearance on a special space in a special time. As a theologian he deals with the transformation of existence in man's individual and social existence, he deals with what concerns us ultimately. As a theologian he cannot transcend his existential situation either in personal or in social respect. His faith and the faith of his Church belong intentionally to his thought. This is true of the philosophical as well as of the kerygmatic theologian. But the philosophical theologian, as a Christian, tries to show in his work that the existential situation of the Christian Church is at the same time the place where the meaning of being has appeared as our ultimate concern. In other words: he tries to show that Jesus as the Christ is the Logos.

The methodological way in which this must be done

cannot be explained in this article. It cannot be shown how conflicts between special forms of philosophy and the Christian message might be overcome at all and are not rooted in ultimate existential decisions. This is a matter for concrete elaboration. Neither can it be shown why, in a philosophical theology, philosophy must provide the concepts and categories and the problems implied in them to which theology gives the answers drawn from the substance of the Christian message. I only want to give the following indications: Philosophical theology deals with the concept of experience and the categories belonging to it and leads to the existential problem implied in experience, to which the answer is: Revelation. Philosophical theology deals with the concept of being and the categories belonging to it, and it leads to the existential problem implied in being, to which the answer is: God. Philosophical theology deals with the concept of existence and the categories belonging to it and leads to the existential problem implied in existence, to which the answer is: The Christ. Philosophical theology deals with the concept of life and the categories belonging to it and leads to the existential problem implied in life, to which the answer is: The Spirit. Philosophical theology deals with the concept of history and the categories belonging to it and leads to the existential problem implied in history, to which the answer is: The Kingdom of God. This is the task and the way of philosophical theology following from the basic definitions given above. It is a permanent work going on from century to century as philosophy goes on and the life of the Church goes on. The end of this kind of philosophical theology would be the end of the universal claim of the Christian Church, the end of the message that Jesus is the Christ. What has appeared as our ultimate existential concern has appeared at the same time as the logos of being. This is the fundamental Christian claim and the infinite subject of Philosophical Theology.

Paul Tillich.

The Double Standard in Christian Ethics

"So grew up the extraordinarily perplexing phenomenon of a double moral standard—a lower and a higher grade of Christian achievement, the distinction between counsels and precepts, the religious and the secular vocations, the contemplative and active lives. There can be no doubt that the distinction saved Christianity. It reconciled every extremist who was prepared to face the facts at all, and so retained within the Church that witness to Christian other-worldliness so greatly needed at a time of acute secularization. But it left the Christian moralist with the curiously elusive problem—How far, if at all, is the distinction thus expressed of any ultimate validity?"—K. E. Kirk in *The Vision of God*, p. 240.

Four or five years ago a distinguished Italian journalist gave a lecture in Rome on Sanctity. He was much under the influence of Bergson, and his contention was that the saint is one among many types which the *élan vital* produces. Just as it may produce oranges or lemons, lions or tigers, so it may result in saints or politicians or engineers or generals. The saint is a specialist; holiness is his *métier*. To an English listener the argument was unexpected, not because of any difficulty in accepting an analogy between the working of the life force in nature and that of grace in human vocation, but because of the very limited conception of sanctity implied.

The Protestant Reformation—and it is generally considered one of its finest achievements—uncompromisingly discarded a conception of sanctity based on a double standard. It would have nothing to do with the specialist in holiness. It was held that man found God not by turning his back on the world but by the faithful performance of his this-worldly duties, and sanctity came to be regarded, not as one among many alternative vocations, but as a quality of life to be realized in and through any secular vocation. The acceptance of the double standard had led, it was believed, to a low level of civic virtue on the one hand, and to a socially unfruitful introversion on the other.

In reaffirming the importance of the precepts the Reformers were undoubtedly right. Love of God and of one's neighbour is central in the Christian life, and this fact may be obscured by an overstraining of the distinction between precepts and counsels. In reaffirming this centrality they made for a higher ideal of civic virtue and of

public service. But perhaps, as often happens, they were less right in what they denied. Perhaps there was loss as well as gain. Protestantism, it has been said, has been "less rich in examples of heroic Christianity. It has not made for or achieved unique saints."[1] "One half of Europe," says von Hügel,[2] "paid a heavy price for this apparently quite simple return to the supposed utter uniformity of call for all men as described in the gospels." From various quarters there comes a demand for a return to some sort of double standard. Mr T. S. Eliot, for instance, in a recent book[3] urges that the "Christian community" needs to be leavened by a "community of Christians." Dr A. D. Lindsay, with a quite different approach, and without any reference to counsels and precepts, finds a double standard in the morality of my station and its duties and the morality of grace.[4] Soren Kierkegaard, his biographer tells us,

> again and again repeated the indignant remark that "place No. 1 has dropped out so that place No. 2 has become the first place." Protestantism has rejected with scorn the distinction between "the requirements of Christian ideality" and the minimum which the Church must exact of all its members, with the hope that by God's grace it may be accounted sufficient for salvation but with the clear understanding that it represents "place No. 2." It is a proud boast of Protestantism that it has abolished such a distinction between Christians—with the aim of raising them all to the same level. But the practical outcome of it is that "place No. 1 has dropped out" and "place No. 2," a bourgeois conception of Christianity, a minimum of otherworldliness which does not conflict with inner-worldly aims but rather serves to exalt them, is all that is left, and so is automatically promoted to the first place.[5]

The moment is perhaps not inopportune for a re-examination of this question of a double standard. Is there any principle of definition, whether based on the counsels and precepts or not, which would clearly distinguish place No. 1 from place No. 2, and reveal a difference not of degree but of kind?

Such a distinction would be a distinction, not between good and bad, the city of God and the city of Babylon, but

[1] James O. Hannay in *E.R.E.* sub v. "Counsels." [2] F. von Hügel, *Essays and Addresses*, i, p. 282. [3] *The Idea of a Christian Society.* [4] A. D. Lindsay, *The Two Moralities.* [5] Walter Lowrie, *Kierkegaard*, p. 334.

between good and good, and two such distinctions seem to present themselves.

There is first the difference between nature and supernature. This is not a distinction between God and the world, because God is in both nature and supernature. It is a distinction between two orders of reality and, especially, between two orders of society, the natural, conditioned by bodily needs and the sharing of material goods which diminish when shared; the other in which the good things shared are spiritual and increase with sharing.[1] The one based on good sense, in which rights and obligations are as nicely adjusted as the movements of the heavenly bodies; the other into which ecstasy and infinity enter at every point and people are led to do silly things like plucking out an eye or turning the other cheek. The one in which virtue is always a mean and the good man's aim is to restrain other people's rapacity and his own, in which self-love and self-interest are legitimate motives but must be tempered by regard for other people's claims; the other in which the virtues never go bad by reason of excess, because it is impossible to have too much faith or hope or charity, in which self-love must be replaced by hatred of self, and the aim of every citizen is to be broken bread and poured-out wine.

Very closely related to this distinction is another perhaps best expressed as that between the once-born and the twice-born. This is not simply the same difference in a subjective or psychological form, for spiritual rebirth involves not merely awareness of the distinction between nature and supernature, an act of cognition or of faith, but the surrender of the will to the claims of the supernatural, co-operation with grace. The change may be a scarcely perceptible reaction or it may be like the explosion of a bomb. Perfect responsiveness to grace combined with sensitive awareness of spiritual reality and paradox is sanctity indeed, but the two do not always go hand in hand, for it is possible to have faith without goodwill (the condition, according to St Thomas, of the devils), and it is also possible for people to live very supernatural lives on very imperfect theology.

[1] Chè per quanti si dice più lì " nostro "
Tanto possiede più di ben ciascuno
E più di caritate arde in quel chiostro.
DANTE: *Purg.* XV, 55-57.

When a man has become conscious of the demands of supernature and wishes to make the maximum response, a tension between the claims of these two worlds is created and problems of adjustment inevitably arise. The tension may present itself categorically as a choice between world-acceptance and world-renunciation. World-renunciation would put first things first. The medieval mind was more alive than we are to the dangers of the active life. Men were distracted and snared by the cares of this world and the deceitfulness of riches and the lusts of other things and they believed that "man is placed between the things of this world and spiritual goods wherein eternal happiness consists; so that the more he cleaves to the one the more he withdraws from the other and conversely."[1] Those who would accept the world were then on the defensive. The world-accepting view has since become aggressive, and not only urges the sanctity of secular vocations but deprecates any *ascesis* beyond that furnished by the daily round and the common task which, it is claimed, readily afford a discipline as severe and exacting as that of the cloister. There is a robust element of truth in the view that the active life may be regarded as a preparatory discipline[2] and that the Beatific Vision, like the virtue of humility, cannot be reached by aiming at it directly, but only by the looking-glass method of careful attention to immediate duty. But world-acceptance is spiritually more possible if the trivial round presents itself as something tiresome and difficult, calling forth all our resources of prayer and endurance. The problem arises in its acutest form when it is full of joy and interest and this-worldly satisfactions. An equilibrium between these two strong forces is possible; a wise detachment which accepts the really good things of this world with both hands if they come, and lets them go without regret. But the theological virtues are not middle courses. It would have been useless to expound this view to St Francis, though he would no doubt have said that it was the right way for anyone who felt like that about it. When a man has found the pearl of great price he gladly sells all that he has.

Perhaps the Middle Ages despaired too much of the world, though some are wondering to-day whether our own optimism has not been too trustful of human nature, too blind to the

[1] *S.T.*, II, I, CVIII, 4.

[2] Kirk, *op. cit.*, p. 243.

terrible reality of evil. But with our abandonment of uncompromising world-renunciation and our more sanguine views about society the tension between the claims of nature and of supernature has assumed a rather different form. It is no longer a question of a tension between selfish this-worldly interests and the claims of the other world. A man may serve this-worldly ends with unselfish devotion and more than monastic asceticism; but he is a citizen of two worlds, " incurably amphibious," with two sets of duties, needs and satisfactions[1] which will not always harmonize. At best, like Lazarus,

> He holds on firmly to some thread of life . . .
> Which runs across some vast distracting orb
> Of glory on either side that meagre thread,
> Which conscious of he must not enter yet—
> The spiritual life around the earthly life . . .
> His heart and brain move there, his feet stay here.
> So is the man perplext with impulses
> Sudden to start off crosswise not straight on
> Proclaiming what is right and wrong across
> And not along—this black thread through the blaze—
> " It should be " balked by " here it cannot be."[2]

At worst, our greater confidence in the world and in the possibility of living full Christian lives within it has brought with it a danger of losing our vision of the end and our hold on the great medieval doctrine of a hierarchy of ends.

> The monastic ideal of renunciation [to quote Kierkegaard, *apud* Lowrie, again] is the expression of absolute respect for the absolute telos. The Reformation contemptuously discarded this expression of absolute respect for the absolute telos and abolished the infinite qualitative distinction [between relative ends and the absolute end]. It " mediated " between the claim of the absolute and the many claims of the relative by asserting that the absolute is expressed concretely in the relative. " Protestantism is finiteness from end to end."[3]

A hard saying, but it contains a salutary warning of the danger of either forgetting supernature in our enthusiasm for limited loyalties or forgetting the finiteness of nature in our attempts to bring the two sets of loyalties and needs into harmony.

Our awareness of this second tension has of recent years

[1] Von Hügel, *The German Soul.* [2] Robert Browning, *Epistle of Karshish.* [3] Lowrie, *Kierkegaard*, p. 332.

become so acute that it will not be surprising if we witness in our time a return to the world-renouncing ideal on the part of many eager souls. Here too, no doubt, a wise equilibrium is possible, an intense awareness of the claims of supernature combined with a hopefulness about human society which sets no limits to possible improvements and yet is free from all utopianism.[1] Such an adjustment is costly and difficult, and will depend on the apprehension of three things:

First, that the absolute end is more fruitfully thought of as the Kingdom of God rather than as the Vision of God. The Beatific Vision is a beginning rather than an end, a beginning which renders possible among the souls which share it a social life which is an *ἐνεργεία κατ' ἀρετήν* of loving service.

And, second, though that life is not attainable in its fulness here and now, there is, once the end is clearly recognized, a greater possibility of "mediation" than Kierkegaard would allow. Otherwise we should indeed be driven to complete world-renunciation and it would be impossible for religious people ever to pursue relative ends with entire seriousness. For Kierkegaard, with all his profound penetration into religious reality, was liable to miss just that sacramental quality of life which alone gives reality to history and significance to our poor vocations and efforts, what von Hügel calls "the uncompromising Transcendence and the compromising Immanence . . . both necessary and closely interrelated."[1]

And, third, that our task is simply the humble one of co-operating with God's grace, which is always seeking to transform the good of nature into the perfection of supernature and which in this world gains its triumphs through failure and defeat.

The difference between nature and supernature reveals, then, not only a difference between two types of souls, but a certain inevitable tension within all quickened souls, who, longing to implement their citizenship of that other world, are driven either to complete renunciation of this world or to the service of ideals which they know can never be fully realized here and now. On both alike grace does impose tasks and responsibilities. Within the realm of

[1] Von Hugel, *The German Soul.*

relative ends each Christian has his own vocation, and some vocations are higher than others. But heavenly values would often seem to cut right across any ordered scheme of relative ends. World-acceptance cannot carry us so far as to assume that the greatest saints must be those, greatly though they are needed, who, combining sanctity with wisdom and intelligence, most perfectly fill positions of worldly responsibility. Indeed, rare as saints are in any walk of life, an empirical survey of important people, kings and statesmen and even popes, does not yield a very high percentage of sanctity, perhaps because such people are peculiarly exposed to some or all of the temptations which the counsels would have us guard against, and have to live their amphibious life with much compromise, which, however inevitable, blunts the sensibilities. St Alexis as well as St Gregory has his place in the hierarchy of vocation, though what that place is is known to God alone.

Is there, then, a specifically religious vocation ? a specialized vocation to sanctity, so specialized, because so world-renouncing, that it precludes an ordinary secular vocation ? Are some people called to follow the counsels ?

A call to world-renunciation undoubtedly presents itself to some people under certain social conditions. It presents itself both because under such conditions it is the only way for some souls to find God at all and because a visible and even a spectacular protest against wrong values is a social need. Only it should be noted that it is not then a specialized call to sanctity, but rather a call to interior discipline as an individual, or to a very special way of life, a stressing of values which society at its peril neglects, as a contribution to the life of the community—as much a form of social service as the work of the statesman or the engineer, which, it is rightly claimed, equally admit of being religious vocations.

It may be that to some extent the need for such a protest is a measure of the sickness of society, and that the more a society is sound and wholesome the more sanctity will develop along world-accepting rather than world-rejecting lines. But even if we lived in a society which was really civilized and really Christian, in so far as that is possible in this world, a society in which great opportunities and interests lay at the feet of all who cared to take them, there would still be some, and often those most sensitively alive to the best things that security and leisure can bring, who

would from some inner constraint choose the way of world-renunciation.

Lives in which such renunciation really springs from eager love may be immensely fruitful, and such people have some claim to be considered specialists in sanctity because, while some can perhaps please God and please themselves, they are convinced that they can only please God by doing violence to themselves, and are prepared to serve Him at any cost. At the same time it is not in a difference of vocation, and not in the distinction between precepts and counsels, that the definition of the double standard is to be sought, for souls of this type have no monopoly either of sanctity or of the counsels. Sanctity is possible in any vocation and in any circumstances.

The real distinction is between those who, however dimly, are aware of and have tried to respond to the call of the supernatural and those who are citizens of one world only, the once-born and the twice-born. This is the double standard. On either side this dividing line there are all sorts of stages and degrees of sanctity, on the one hand, and integrity on the other, and of failure on both, and many professing Christians are to be found on the natural side of the line. The demarcation, however, is there, a difference of kind. But counsels and precepts alike belong to the supernatural side of the line and no further distinction can be made between those who follow only the precepts and those who also follow the counsels.

The precepts belong to supernature. This-worldly morality may, it is true, display a certain grace or gracefulness, so that those who wish to be guided by love may easily be put to shame by the greater accomplishment of sheer good manners, and in a professedly Christian society Christian ideals are to some extent operative even among those who do not fully accept them. But the precepts are of such a quality that they cannot be dynamic in the lives of those who are unalive to spiritual values, and the counsels, certainly, are simply paradoxical, cutting right across Kant's excellent maxim. They can mean little or nothing to the good man who is only once-born; yet they must in some form enter the lives of all the twice-born.

In some form; not necessarily in the uncompromising form of monasticism. Dives may practise poverty, living modestly and investing and re-investing his surplus, perhaps a greater and not less exacting social service than if he gave

it all away. Chastity is a quality of spirit which has no necessary connexion with celibacy, and obedience consists in the joyful acceptance of things as they come and an imaginative responsiveness to grace. Nor can unconditional acceptance of the counsels be said to be a higher way than the other, for God's grace will stretch to the very limits of its finite capacity any soul that yields itself to Him whether within the cloister or outside.

And what will determine a man's place in the heavenly hierarchy is not the degree to which he follows the counsels but his capacity for love. Love is a precept, the precept *par excellence*, πρώτη πάντων (Mark xii, 28), and yet, unlike the counsels, which can to some extent be obeyed by our own determination and effort, it would seem useless to command it for it is wholly a gift, the greatest of all spiritual gifts.

And that no doubt—for sanctity is no human achievement but a gift of God—is why it is the only criterion of sanctity and the only right motive for following the counsels at all. To convert the counsels themselves or any other form of spiritual discipline into such a criterion, to regard them alone as the principle of definition which underlies the double standard, is disastrous, and perhaps helps to explain the disrepute into which the double standard has fallen and the not wholly unreasonable dislike which many people have for a spiritual *élite* of any kind, or for any way of life which involves a peculiar degree of self-discipline. The nicest people to live with, it has been said, are those who are selfish but well-bred, and Jesus Himself seems to have preferred the company not of the very good but of quite ordinary and even thoroughly disreputable people.

The counsels are in fact, as St Thomas tells us, a means to an end.[1] To exaggerate their importance is to distort Christianity. It is, however, no less perilous to minimize it and seek to eliminate the monastic ideal, which affirms just those values which in a half-pagan or predominantly world-accepting Christianity are easily overlooked, and, at its best, affirms them out of love and for the sake of the social body as a whole. Moreover, though the counsels are means and not ends, and their normal value is that of a

[1] Consilia per quæ melius et expeditius potest homo consequi finem prædictum. Consilium autem in optione ponitur ejus cui datur.—*S.T.*, II, I, CVIII, 4.

discipline which makes the way of love more possible, what really underlies the respect for the counsels is the deeply Christian intuition that suffering is not something to be avoided, or even accepted, but something to be eagerly embraced. For there are in fact not two but three stages or standards or places.

There is first of all natural goodness. There are the ordinary good citizens who have never felt the call to a supernatural life but who try to live according to their lights and may reach a very high level of integrity.

There are those who have heard that call and are seeking God. This involves always some element of self-discipline, of world-rejection—of rejection not only of things that are harmful but of things that are good in themselves, and self-discipline is easily unlovely and often the most egoistical thing ever. In some cases this self-discipline will involve a very high degree of asceticism, most distasteful to the good man on the natural level and to all sensible people; but the best saints are ardent souls with strong passions, and dying to the world is not easy. On the other hand less sensible people, exaggerating the importance of the counsels, will often mistake this asceticism for the last stage and attribute sanctity where it is not yet due.

For there are also the rare souls who have arrived. It matters not at all whether they follow the counsels as a vocation. Such souls are not only twice-born, they are dead to this world; *ζῶ δέ, οὐκέτι ἐγώ, ζῇ δὲ ἐν ἐμοὶ Χριστός* (Gal. ii, 20). Life or death is a matter of indifference to them except in so far as it would seem that there is still work for them to do here rather than *in patria*. They are quite free from the unloveliness which comes from constant effort directed towards self-mortification and yet seem able to endure with entire serenity any amount of fatigue and hardship. They show how shallow the usual distinction between the active and the contemplative life really is; for, if action is a preparation for prayer, prayer is the only sane foundation for action, and it is the true contemplative alone who is tirelessly and fruitfully active; Martha, the door which is always in motion though the hinges are always at rest. The difference between the *petentes* and the *invenientes* is at least as great as that between those who have ears to hear and those who have not. The whole matter has been well summed up thus. Three attitudes to the cross are possible—for good people, leaving out the

mockers. There are those who pass it by with indifference; there are those who see its significance and turn aside to worship at its foot; and there are those who, somehow, are on the cross with the Crucified, sharing His sufferings and seeing the world through His eyes. MABEL BURDESS.

The Moral Influence of Literature

THE vocation of the writer is a drastic one; and never is it more drastic than during those darker periods of history in which such things as war or pestilence or social crisis occur. For while it is the business of the majority to achieve so far as possible a condition of imperviousness to the results of these ills, it is the job of the writer to quicken his emotional sensibilities by sharing in the plight of his fellows imaginatively even when he cannot do so physically. We all know that it is part of a soldier's training for war, part of a doctor's training in surgery and of a chimney-sweep's training in sweeping chimneys, to become hardened against the exacting demands of their profession by a process of gradual immunity from the ailments or the pains involved; but the writer, if his imaginative sympathy is to be quickened, must try deliberately and of set purpose to feel the pains and the pleasure that are the lot of humanity at large—for only so can he hope to recreate their joys and agonies in the printed word.

All this implies, what has often been said but seldom explained, that writing is less a craft to be practised than a life to be lived—that, in fact, the man of letters is the human being *par excellence*, the man to whom all human experience is material for his job. He is, if he is worth his salt, at once an ascetic and an epicurean—one who must taste of the sweets and bitters of life to a sufficient degree for imaginative consumption but deny them any permanent place in his existence that would drive out other experiences or contaminate him. This is, of course, a counsel of perfection—one that few literary artists have achieved; but, where something like it actually *has* been accomplished, a most sublime artistic balance, a perfectly unshaken poise, has been the result. Moreover, no creative artist has failed entirely to achieve it—or his art would have been blighted

before it bloomed. The most that can be said is that, in the case of some, the delicate poise has been lost or perhaps the whole thing shattered before it reached maturity.

Now this explains, as nothing else quite does, why the men of letters invariably anticipate the men of law in the matters concerned with moral and social reform; nor are they merely political theorists who bring these changes about. It is, I suppose, true that the French Revolution owed something to Rousseau and Lafayette; but it had been made possible by the renaissance of imaginative literature in France which produced Racine and Voltaire. We have grown used to the proletariat adulation of Karl Marx as the apostle of the Russian Revolution; but I suspect that it will be ultimately acknowledged to have lain much deeper in the blood and soil of Russia than that. Tolstoy, Gorki, Gogol and Dostoievsky supply ample dynamite for revolution—not because of anything revolutionary in themselves, though that was by no means always lacking, but because their epics of Russian life in the raw awoke feelings in the breast of their readers which had slumbered through many centuries. It would probably be true to say that a pound of fiction will go as far as a ton of political economy in manufacturing dynamite for a revolution; because while the political economist can stir your intellect, the poet and the novelist can fire the heart and quicken the imagination. They are the men whom the diehards should imprison—as the totalitarian leaders know too well!

The glamorous story of the Roman Empire is indeed one of the marvels of history; and not the least marvellous thing about it was the capacity of anything so morally corrupt to persist upon such a tremendous scale for so long a period of time. There were, of course, such men as Seneca and Marcus Aurelius right at the heart of it and once at the helm, and the Christian religion budded and flowered like a sensitive plant in the midst of an alien hothouse; but if we take its stock of literature as a whole, we must admit that little of it was designed for moral uplift. Heroism, except in Plutarch, was largely shunned; and love was treated as a subject for mockery. Satire and cynicism were the fashionable moods while the old gods rotted on their pedestals, and we look in vain, outside the Christian Church, for any voice raised in pity or horror at the lot of most mortals or for any sense of a judgment hanging over a doomed and disintegrating world.

This is the more curious in view of the fact that Rome possessed an underworld as dark as any in modern Europe; but no voice was raised in protest of its shamefulness. There were, of course, great minds that were revolted by the spectacle of lust and cruelty for which society in the Roman world was a by-word; but such minds were didactic rather than creative in the imaginative sense. Plutarch, Suetonius, Dion and Tacitus were aware of right and wrong, justice and injustice, and Tacitus at least was sensitive to the finer edges of morality; but all were alike unconscious of whole tracts of the human mind, as the psychologist has disclosed it, and whole areas of squalid misery as must have been known to the majority of the populations about which they wrote. The story of the Roman Empire on any showing was dark and tragic and evil enough; but the history of its underworld has simply never been written. It has been left to the pen of imaginative writers of a more enlightened age to stir it up from the depths where it has stagnated for so many centuries; and they have had to rely upon intuition rather than upon much historical data for their material.

There are, it must be admitted, moments in European history when the historian shows up the dark passages, when the shadows play across the picture; but such moments are not the result of a premeditated or digested imaginative experience so much as an attempt to give a true and accurate account without whitewashing. At times the moral effect is greatly enhanced by the writer's apparent callousness. The anonymous recorder in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicles says of the anarchy in Stephen's reign: " they took those whom they suspected of having any goods by night and by day, seizing both men and women, and they put them in prison for their gold and silver, and tortured them with pains unspeakable . . . many thousands they exhausted with hunger. . . . Then was corn dear, and flesh, and cheese and butter, for there was none in the land . . . they robbed the monks and the clergy, and every man plundered his neighbour as much as he could. . . . It was said openly that Christ and His Saints slept." There is, in this little patch of darkness, more misery and horror than in many pages of pious exhortation because it reveals, in a few strokes of the pen, the sum total of human wretchedness as it existed at a certain time at a certain place. For a moment the historian had become a creative

artist—one who had dipped his pen into the gall of human bitterness instead of the colourless ink of the recorder.

This ability—or, I would rather say, vital necessity—of the creative artist to identify himself with the subject of his artistic creation is necessarily a Christian virtue, because it is the principle of the Incarnation. There are not wanting those to-day who, both inside and outside the literary world, and both inside and outside the Christian Church, maintain that they can remain aloof from the society in which they form a unit. This is not done in the spirit of the hermit whose life in the desert is a challenge to those who remain in the city but as a protest against the sins of society at large. I would not exempt certain pacifists from this attitude—an attitude which refuses to participate in war, not because there is anything intrinsically evil in war as such, but because they have never identified themselves with the sins and the blunders of a society which has inevitably landed itself in war.

The duty of the Christian—less clear on other issues concerned with morality in general and pacifism in particular—is surely at least clear on this issue, that he may not identify himself with the sin of his fellows but can equally never refuse to identify himself with their punishment. To do so is not only an attempt to put himself outside the pale of redemption, but is even a refusal of the very means whereby the redeemed human race can participate in Christ's work of redemption. The Cross was a frank and complete acceptance of the sin of the world at its face value—a deliberate refusal on the part of God to escape the consequences of human sin; and it is, I maintain, a direct result of the Cross that the work of the imaginative intellect is consecrated.

So it is that the literary artist who deliberately identifies himself with the tragedy of human existence and shows it up in its true colours is participating in the healing and cleansing work of redemption. There is, of course, a theological difference between the creative artist who is a baptized and practising Christian and one who is not, in that the former may claim that, as a member of the Body of Christ, his work in this sphere may be regarded as the direct outcome of Calvary—"filling up what is lacking" in the Passion of Christ, to quote St Paul; but even for the pagan or agnostic author, to whom the idea of redemption may be meaningless or even repugnant, there is a more

than purely humanist value in this work, providing it is the result of an attempt to identify himself with universal tragedy.

This does perhaps explain, in a dim and approximate fashion, why tragedy affects us far more deeply than any other kind of creative art quite does—a fact which has baffled many an inquiring mind. For the greatest works of mankind are in the tragedies they have written—not in their comedies or satires. The greatest dramas of Shakespeare, the greatest symphonies of Beethoven, the greatest novels of Tolstoy and the greatest operas of Wagner, are not those which play among the lights and shades of comedy —though all but Tolstoy could achieve this to perfection— but those which tell of darkness, anger, fear and the abyss.

There is something inspirational about these works that is not purely artistic—something that from Aristotle's *Poetics* to Streeter's *Reality* all have attempted to explain in terms of ethic rather than of art; and which, I maintain, is in a very vital sense ethical. The trouble about so much non-Christian philosophy (and, alas, of some Christian philosophy) is that the Cross has been explained in terms of this ethical tragedy rather than this ethical tragedy in terms of the Cross. What I mean is that a Christian revolution is demanded in the realm of art as much as in the social sphere; that we have partly gone wrong; and that, if Calvary is God's answer to the problems of the world, then tragedy is essentially and in actual fact a more godlike form of art than either comedy or satire *because in tragedy man's answer to the world more closely approximates to God's.*

This is, I admit, a revolutionary dogma—at least so far as the canons of art are concerned; but those who ignore it are always left with something unresolved in their interpretation of great tragic art. The plays of Shakespeare, the symphonies of Beethoven and the epic novels of Tolstoy cannot be interpreted aright without direct acknowledgment of an " upside-downness " in the universe that can only be put the right way up again by the elevation of the Cross. For Calvary, besides being the centre of all history and all moral perfection, must surely, if it is to have a supreme meaning for the whole mind of man, be also the centre of his art.

There have, of course, been great creative artists who were not Christians. By them the debt has been uncon-

sciously paid; and we may surely see in the tragedies of Æschylus or even the epic poetry of Virgil an unconscious derivation from the same divine source as that which inspired a Dante or a Goethe; and, as the Church incorporated Platonism and later Aristotelianism in her philosophical system, so surely we may recognize in the great tragedies of the pagan mind anticipations of a philosophy of ethics that would receive final consummation in the Christian philosophy of art. I would even dare to suggest that the bourgeois population, which has a dim and unreasonable notion that things which are sad are necessarily more beautiful than things which are happy, is at least groping after a profound truth—though the feeling often results in the most deplorable exhibitions of bad taste. The popularity of such tawdry novelists as Marie Corelli and such milk-and-water poets as Ella Wheeler Wilcox, not to mention some positively execrable stained-glass windows, is at least partially the result of a profound instinct that has lost its way—a sense that the tragedies with which these artists, or products of a cheap art, deal is in some way of a higher order than that of the music-hall.

There is no reason that I can see, apart from Christian theology, why tragedy should be of a higher order than comedy or satire, but we probably have to thank the bourgeois instinct, for better or worse, for the impetus that this search for tragedy gave to a loftier conception of the human problem in nineteenth-century creative literature and for the dynamite in the works not only of Kingsley and Morris but Dickens and Ruskin. For nineteenth-century literature, whatever its faults, developed a social philosophy which derived immediately from the problem novel of its day. The novels of Dickens, Kingsley and Charles Reade did more to prick the public conscience than any number of debates in Parliament.

The eighteenth-century novel dealt with low life in terms of comedy and satire. There was no problem of the poor, as such, for that particularly heedless era. Much of the work of Swift, of Smollett and of Fielding is like an echo of Juvenal or Apuleius—the post-Augustan age in coats and periwigs; and sin was exposed as human folly rather than as a subject for divine wrath or pity—the poor, as such, were not interesting. They had no problems for that mellow age; but royalty lent a certain glamour to the printed page. So Sir Walter Scott, on the eve of what was

to prove a great romantic revival, popularized the historical novel, splashing his pages with the pomp and pageantry of kings. Even Jane Austen, whose gentle irony hedged in a little world of its own, dealt with high life in great country houses, whose sloping lawns and chandeliers were expected to see the very stars out. It was a smooth, green, placid England of which she wrote, where war was an export and even human passion an intruder; and neither she nor the reading public were disturbed by the lives and problems of the poor.

The first hint that all was not well came out with the poetry of Shelley and Wordsworth; but, explosive as some of this was, it deafened rather than softened those for whom it was intended. The novel of low life burst almost unawares upon a public whose mind had at any rate been stirred and shaken; and, if Dickens had begun to rouse the public conscience in *Pickwick*, it was but the first of a number of shocks. His comedy contained that element of tragedy that together make up the sum-total of existence; and, if it be complained that his characters were more than life-size, it might fairly be retorted that something larger than the usual size was needed to awaken his nineteenth-century audience out of their complacency. At about the same time George Eliot disclosed the life of country peasants as a thing of passion, heroism and romance; and it was not long before the Brontë sisters inaugurated, from their quiet Yorkshire parsonage, what may truly be called the emancipation of their sex in fiction. Kingsley, Ruskin, Charles Reade and William Morris soon swelled the band of pioneers, while Ruskin and Carlyle, in their different ways, disclosed in graphic detail the evils of an industrialized community.

The strange, wild genius of Dickens that would stick in corners and agonize over self-conscious little children, could achieve sublime moments of impassioned rhetoric at the spectacle of misery his own age was tolerating. His words strike much deeper than any locality of time and space when he exclaims: "And now that the cloud settled down on St Antoine, which a momentary gleam had driven from its sacred countenance, the darkness of it was heavy—cold, dirt, sickness, ignorance and want were lords in waiting on the saintly presence—nobles of great power all of them; most especially the last. Samples of a people that had undergone a terrible grinding and re-grinding in the

mill. . . . Hunger was pushed out of the tall houses in the wretched clothes that hung upon poles and lines; Hunger was patched into them with straw and rag, and wood and paper; Hunger was repeated in every fragment of the small modicum of firewood that the men sawed off; Hunger stared down from the smokeless chimneys and stared up from the filthy street that had no offal, among its refuse, of anything to eat. . . ." That is a passage as moving as anything that the great creative genius of Dickens ever penned; and it was provoked, as nothing else of greatness in that age, by the spectacle of a human tragedy that had slept in darkness and security since the dawn of civilization. It is easy to cast a slur upon the reforming zeal of the great Victorian writers—to associate Dickens with the revival of the Christmas carol and the advent of the Christmas card, or Ruskin with that shady business, the neo-Gothic revival in Church art; but this is to parody their work unfairly and to mistake its shallow accidentals for blood-and-flesh realities.

It is probably owing to those I have named more than to the whole host of parliamentary and social reforms that their work did not end in a mere landslide from feudalism to an equally tyrannical and more unnatural form of government—an exchange from the squire to the mill- and the mine-owner. For there was nothing in the Reform Bill of 1832 to prevent the industrial lords from having it all their own way, a feat that was largely achieved for a while.

Perhaps a generation of writers will arise who will one day rid us of that modern curse—a total war; but I think this will be more difficult to achieve if only because war is itself the outcome of human tragedy. For it is, I think, the function of the writer to deal with that tragedy as he sees it and whenever it occurs; and if his influence grows with education and the power of the printed word, the causes of war may become fewer and fewer. Already the whole world turns naturally to the men who can write when a crisis is upon them; and I suspect that the Devil knows what he is doing when he pushes the editorial pen !

Ashley Sampson.

" Women which Labour in the Gospel "[1]

Some time ago the Editor asked me to write a short article for Theology on the subject of the work being done in an official capacity by women in the Church. I have hesitated for some time because I am convinced that there are important and urgent things to be said, yet I have been afraid lest, by reason of emphasizing some aspects which need attention, I may seem to see things out of proportion, and so may succeed in misleading. It is the special beauty and the glory of womanhood to serve, and it is as servants of our Lord in His Church that we shall most truly fulfil ourselves. But a servant is not a drudge, and it cannot be denied that all too often in the past a generous-minded woman, offering her services, has been so viewed by those in authority. A trusted servant can be a partner in a cause, and we can now, I think, look hopefully to the day when priests and laymen and laywomen will work together as partners, each contributing his or her special gifts and recognizing the gifts of the others, and allowing scope for their exercise.

I hope I may be forgiven a personal reminiscence, for it has significance. Towards the end of the last war, when I was in my thirties, I was engaged in a post of " special responsibility " in the training of professional teachers. This, even though before the days of the Burnham Scale, involved a substantial salary with the promise of a pension on which anyone could reasonably live. Through contact with a body of people not specially trained for the work, who were engaged in bringing new light into religious education in dioceses and parishes, I became impressed by the importance of this work and had a desire to be associated with them in it. I asked if there was a sphere in which I could be used, and was told authoritatively " Most certainly, yes," but what salary would I need? I named £200, about half of what I was then receiving, and with no pension attached. I was told that a bishop had rejected my suggestion on the score that the salary asked was " more than we give a deacon." I knew very little in those days of the inner workings of the Church, and less of its financial arrangements. The statement astonished me, but later,

[1] Phil. iv, 3.

when I was privileged to hold office in the diocese of Southwark, I began sadly to realize the significance of the remark. I found that there were able women attached to parishes doing full-time work of the very greatest value, who were receiving a stipend of £60 a year and even less. At that time the Church had no plan at all for providing for the old age of those who had served her at great self-sacrifice, and often very effectively, some of them with no private means at all or provision for the future. It is true that these people had had little or no special preparation for their work, but all were accepted labourers in the vineyard and were worthy of their hire. I should not have felt inclined to recount this personal experience except that it forms a dark background on which to throw the somewhat brighter picture of the present; but I want to show that even that picture is painted in greys and sombre colours.

The period of which I have written preceded the Report of the Lambeth Conference of 1920. Few may know or remember that the report included a resolution concerning the place of women in the Church, and drew attention to efforts being made in some dioceses to give greater recognition to the work done by women, more especially in the parishes. Boards of Women's Work, with secretaries, had already come into being in a few dioceses; their concern was to explore the conditions under which women were working, to stimulate desire for and provide means of training for Church work, to befriend the women already at work, and to attract to the work a body of women who, by reason of education and ability, would raise the whole standard of the service offered by women. The result of the 1920 Report was that Boards of Women's Work came into being very quickly in all the more progressive dioceses, and now all but fifteen have such a Board. There is no need to go into details of history, but the present Central Council for Women's Church Work is the outcome of a steady and very rapid growth. This is a consultative and administrative body which co-ordinates the work of the diocesan boards, brings them into association with centres for the training of women Church workers, provides or recognizes appropriate examinations, and grants Certificates of Recognition which show the standard of knowledge and practical efficiency a particular woman has reached.

At the present time a woman can only be recognized for Church work if she has passed an examination in Theology

and in some definite branch of Church work such as Education, Pastoralia, Social or Club or Moral Welfare or Medical Work. Although there are still some workers who have not attained a very high standard, there are increasing numbers who have spent not less than two years in a special training centre and who have passed an appropriate examination. In Theology, what is called the B Grade Inter-Diocesan Recognition Certificate can normally be gained only after two years of study leading to an examination of good standard; many women take a University Degree or Diploma in Theology. The other side of the training is related to the particular kind of work the woman purposes to do, and she will choose her college or settlement accordingly. Great stress is laid upon the practical side of the training, and many hours are spent in such activities as visiting, club work, different forms of social service and teaching. Women who have parish work in view take a very carefully planned course in Pastoralia which includes much practical work. In all colleges arrangements are made for the training of the students in the devout life and the scientific approach to personal problems of their own life and of those whom they may be called upon to help.

The grim financial side of the problem has been partially faced. The present position is that a woman of education and good social background, trained for two years in a college to which incumbents may look for the supply of a full-time trained woman worker, may be sure of receiving the salary of something between £135 and £170 a year, with possibly a further £10 to meet the higher rate of living due to war. Grants are made to incumbents for women workers only through Boards of Women's Work, and no incumbent may engage a worker at less than the minimum salary. Out of that she must pay Government insurance and Church Assembly pension premiums, and must maintain herself. Unless she has private means there is practically nothing left over for books, recreation and holidays. Yet she must keep fresh in mind and body. The very fact that she is a woman will in several ways bring her into a closer contact with the homes of the people than is possible for the clergy. She will share the joys and sorrows of the people, and will often render them very intimate service. She is sought after at all hours of the day and even night. She must be friend and counsellor and perhaps nurse.

The clergy will look to her for an endless number of kinds of work in which the woman's capacity for attention to detail will prove invaluable. Sometimes she is looked upon as a member of the parochial staff, and will attend their meetings; but this is not always so.

It should be noted that in a diocese where there is no Board of Women's Work these safeguards of salaries or conditions of work do not necessarily exist.

There are posts for central administrators such as Advisers on Youth and Children's Work, Moral Welfare Organizers, and it may be hoped in increasing numbers, Messengers and Evangelists in the great factories where large numbers of girls and women are employed. For such posts, as well as for those in parishes, wisdom is needed, breadth of outlook, initiative, great resourcefulness, technical skill and administrative ability. One source of supply for such workers should be the universities; but a woman who has faced the time and expense of a university education should not be asked to make unreasonable financial sacrifice if she is to take up Church work. Another source of supply has proved to be other professions. Women engaged as secretaries, accountants, social workers, school teachers, doctors, nurses, desire by reason of conviction to take up definite full-time Church work, but many cannot possibly face its financial implications. Then, again, among our younger women leaving school there are many who desire Church work as a profession, but parents are loath to let them follow a bent where there is promise of so great insecurity. There is no provision at all, as there is for men, for financial assistance to those who wish to train for Church work, and though there is now a Church Assembly Pension Scheme it is inadequate to meet the need.

And so year by year devoted women, many of whom are able to make the sacrifice because they have small private means, and others because " great is their faith," are raising the whole level of the women's offering in the service of the Church, and slowly and secretly, as it were, are making for themselves a place of great honour; but at the same time year by year a great potential source of strength is being lost to the Church because both those in authority and the rank and file of Churchpeople are ignorant of conditions and do little or nothing to remedy them. The book *Men, Money and the Ministry*, which has gained a good deal of attention (and criticism), might profitably be called " Men,

Women, Money and the Ministry" (Ministry, in my opinion, in the case of women to denote deaconesses and licensed lay workers). One could have hoped that its sequel, *Putting our House in Order*, would have devoted a section to the work of women. Until women are received as true partners, there is bound to be loss. There are movements afoot for the wider recognition of the part that women are now quietly playing in the life of the Church, and for giving them greater scope for their gifts. It may be hoped that Churchpeople themselves will keep informed about what happens, and become more alive to the value of the contribution of women, and will do nothing to hinder the progress of reforms which are sorely needed.

In 1920 the Bishops wrote: "We run a grave risk of wasting a great power, for spiritual good, which, as many are profoundly convinced, it is the will of God that we should use for His better service. We also run the grave risk of alienating from the Church, and even from Christianity, not a few of those able and high-minded women before whom, if they turn to social or educational work, there open out careers of great and increasing responsibility."[1]

Has the Church in this matter advanced too slowly and timidly?

CATHARINE R. NEWBY.

[1] Lambeth Conference, 1920, p. 100.

MISCELLANEA

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REVISED REVIEWS—XIII

Ecce Homo. By John Robert Seeley. 1865.

This book first appeared, anonymously, some seventy-five years ago, and created no small stir in the ecclesiastical world. It has been constantly reprinted: the edition that I have used is the Everyman one, first published in 1908, and reprinted five times since then. It is not difficult to account for its popularity. There was little or nothing in it of that allegedly dangerous element, "the supernatural"; the reasoning is lucid and persuasive; the style, though occasionally it reminds one a little ludicrously of Lamb's *Tales from Shakespeare*, is beautifully clear and flowing, and carries the reader along with it. An inquirer, both then and now, could learn from it much.

The Gospel of Jesus Christ is timeless: but its preachers and interpreters, being human, must show marks of the age to which they belong. It is not surprising, therefore, that some parts of the book should be "dated," and we note some interesting mid-nineteenth-century touches. Thus Seeley refers to "the remarkable softening of manners" that his century had witnessed, when so many cruel practices had been swept away (p. 162); he reminds his readers that they are living "under the blessed light of science, a light yet far from its meridian, and dispersing every day some noxious superstition, some cowardice of the human spirit" (p. 262). In fact:

> When science has discovered something more,
> We shall be happier than we were before.

So, too, the author is cautious in his approach to miracles: "Miracles are, in themselves, extremely improbable things, and

cannot be admitted unless supported by a great consensus of evidence," though he regards the evidence for the Resurrection as very strong indeed. There is, too, an oddly Comteish ring in a phrase which he uses as one of his chapter headings, " The Enthusiasm of Humanity." But if detractors found too much humanity and too little divinity in his treatment of Christ, we may ask whether that was not badly needed in 1865, if we may trust Seeley's account of the attitude of the religious believer towards his Lord then (p. 136): " The prevalent attitude towards him [our Lord] now among many religious men is an awful fear of his supernatural greatness, and a disposition to obey his commands, arising partly from dread of future punishment and hope of reward, and partly from a nobler feeling of loyalty, which, however, is inspired rather by his office than his person." This is supplemented by his definition of preaching as practised at that time (p. 174): " Preaching is moral suasion delivered formally at stated intervals "—a definition enough to make the blood run cold, especially as the writer, a few pages back (p. 165), recognizes justly that Christ bade His disciples " go everywhere, not merely healing diseases, but also proclaiming the kingdom of God and baptizing." It reminds one a little too much of what Ruskin's idea of a preacher was when he was a child—a man saying " People, be good."

One other great difference that will strike a modern reader is in Seeley's approach to his subject: he gives hardly any references to texts or passages in support of his statements (I have noted two only, on pp. 241 and 242), and he does not consider the problem of the sources. Take up any modern treatment of the life and teaching of our Lord—*e.g.*, by Burkitt, or by Gore, or by the Jewish scholar Klausner—and you can be certain of finding (either at the beginning or the end) a substantial section devoted to the question of the reliability of the sources, and of the inter-relation between them. For Seeley, such a problem hardly exists, save in its most general form (p. 60); he is prepared to believe that we have a body of evidence about the words and acts of Jesus Christ which is generally reliable. It might be added, perhaps, that after something like two generations, which have seen the birth and development of *Quellenkritik* and *Formgeschichte*, the position is not really so far from Seeley's; these sciences have been useful as guides and correctives against extravagances, but they are limiting factors, and limiting factors simply. Thus Seeley can anticipate and meet in advance a thesis that was fashionable some forty or fifty years ago, and can still be encountered in some popularizing histories and handbooks, which is that Christ never existed at all. He is not a mythical figure, like Hercules (p. 34), and any attempt to derive the history of the life of our Lord from some curiously compounded memories of (say) Hercules, Attis, Mithras, etc., falls to the ground. Here, modern scholarship would agree

with Seeley, as any man can see who cares to read Pfister's strange *Herakles und Christus* and the reply to it by H. J. Rose, *Herakles and the Gospels*. Indeed, as Seeley points out (p. 35), the character of Jesus Christ " is in all its large features strikingly consistent, and at the same time so peculiar as to be altogether beyond the reach of invention both by individual genius and still more by what is called ' the consciousness of an age.' "

So far we have been treating of differences. But in the rest of the book a modern reader will find much to learn and much to which he will assent. He will feel sometimes that Christianity is made almost too rational, too much like plain sober common sense. But Seeley never allows himself or his readers to forget that Christianity begins as personal devotion to a loving master and friend: it is *not* merely the Sermon on the Mount (p. 77), it is *not* mere preceptual morality (p. 173), it is *not* merely more moral education (p. 206), it is *not* mere philanthropy. On this point I should like to comment that Seeley's remark that there was no philanthropy among the ancients is misleading; however deficient the ancient world may have been in that quality, it was the one that the Greeks ascribed unhesitatingly to the ideal ruler. When we recollect how often Hellenistic monarchs or Roman emperors speak of their *philanthropia*, how much the ancients regarded it as a royal virtue, we can begin to understand why ancient Christians might proclaim that only in Christ the King can *philanthropia* be seen in its true fulness and activity, and that men will only be truly *philanthropoi* as they are *philochristoi*; and that consideration may explain to us why it is that the Eastern Church still prays to our Lord under the beautiful title of φιλάνθρωπε δέσποτα.

Again, Seeley is insistent throughout on the new life and energy that devotion to Christ inspires; there are no longer the inhibitions that the Law or a code imposes upon the individual, but rather the free outflow of energy from an individual who possesses the " law-making power " in himself. " The sinner whom Christ habitually denounces is he who has done nothing " (p. 149). For Christianity is not abstention from wrongdoing; it is a positive and creative energy issuing from single-minded devotion to Christ. Philanthropy then can be seen in its proper perspective: " Christ believed it possible to bind men to their kind, but on one condition—that they were first bound fast to himself " (p. 133).

This is not to say that there are not some passages with which a reader will disagree. There are some things, too, which he will miss. For example, he will not find anything upon the relationship of Christ to the God whose kingdom He proclaimed and to which He summoned mankind. Perhaps this was to be discussed in another treatise which the author promised to his readers (p. 258). But in spite of queries, objections, or disagreements, a reader is bound to find the book stimulating

his thought. There is much which only needs putting into modern jargon to be immediately recognized; thus, on p. 79 he will discern the germ of " the expulsive power of a new affection," on p. 174 he will find some foreshadowings of " the Social Gospel," and on p. 214 he will welcome (or frown at) some fine denunciations of those " who are born for routine and can accommodate themselves to everything but freedom; those who in clinging to the wisdom of the past suppose they love wisdom but in fact love only the past, and love the past only because they hate the living present." He will find, too, some extremely interesting observations, arising out of the theme that Christianity is " not necessarily mild and gentle " (p. 169), which are developed in the chapters devoted to what Seeley calls " the Law of Mercy " and " the Law of Resentment "—but why use the word " Law " ?

Yet when a reader has finished the book the same question may arise in his mind as did in the mind of the present reviewer. Christ's humanity is here set forth in able and persuasive terms, and the author has recognized that Christianity is rooted ultimately in personal devotion to a loved master and friend. But what of Christ's divinity ? If men are fully to understand and follow Christ and His teaching, can they do so properly if the object of their devotion is a great, but long-dead, man ? Must not the reader be led to inquire whether there ought not to be a companion volume—*Ecce Deus* ? Seeley could reply justly that all he had set out to do was to bring down from the clouds a figure regarded in his time with too much fear and slavish obedience. But that figure though human was not merely human: that man was the man of whom the centurion said, " Truly this man was a son of God."

M. P. Charlesworth.

CHURCH HISTORY

A Survey of some Recent Books sent for Review

Students of church history have had frequent occasion for gratitude to Dr B. J. Kidd for his two volumes of *Documents Illustrative of the History of the Church to 461*, and for his *Documents Illustrative of the Continental Reformation.* The gap between these series has now been bridged by his *Documents Illustrative of the History of the Church, 500-1500* (S.P.C.K., 7s. 6d.), which is a most useful and representative selection from the most important sources for this millennium. A good many of the translations are from the compiler's hand. His volume should be assured of a warm welcome and constant use. Is it too much to hope that teachers grappling with the formidable G.O.E. requirements in Church history may be induced to introduce their students to this, and Dr Kidd's other volumes ?

Very different in character and appeal is Mr C. R. Cheney's *English Synodalia of the Thirteenth Century* (Oxford University Press, 10s.). The author has already published an invaluable study of *Episcopal Visitation of Monasteries in the Thirteenth Century*, and in this volume he presents a detailed survey of English diocesan statutes of the same period. A good deal of this survey consists of discussion of the manuscripts of the several collections, which will be of value to the specialist student; but the general reader will find profit and interest alike from the introductory discussion of the diocesan synod. Amongst professed students of ecclesiastical history the book will find a cordial welcome.

The Reformation continues to occupy the attention of students and writers. Professor A. Hamilton Thompson's *Visitations in the Diocese of Lincoln, 1517-1531*, Vol. I (the Lincoln Record Society, vol. 33, n.p.), is a mine of useful and interesting information about the condition of the largest diocese of medieval England on the eve of the Tudor changes. The editor's introduction, comprising part of his Birkbeck Lectures at Trinity College, Cambridge, in 1934-5, provides a magisterial interpretation of the evidence of his documents. It is chiefly valuable as substantiating the conclusions of other workers in the same field concerning the secular and regular clergy. Henceforth there can be no room for doubt as to the need for reform in the medieval Church. Among rectors, non-residence was frequent, and " in such instances the cure of souls was habitually deputed to a curate, hired by the rector for an annual stipend and known as the parish priest." Even among vicars bound canonically to residence, " a growing tendency to disregard this obligation is noticeable after the middle of the fifteenth century." As for the actual parish priests, the curates, they

> were very generally of the same class as most of the villagers among whom they lived, their education was of a very elementary kind, and they had no obligation to keep hospitality such as gave rectors and even vicars a certain degree of social distinction. The local view of their duties was largely mechanical: they were the agents through whom the means of grace were distributed to the parishioners.

Even less favourable is the editor's verdict on the religious. Of open vice, indeed, there was little. The general impression is that " the place goeth not forward."

> That verdict is one which it is impossible to ignore as generally applicable to the religious foundations. . . . If we ask for evidence of piety, of a life regulated by the ideals of the founders of monasticism, in any community as a whole, it is wanting. . . . No one admires the summary methods of Henry VIII's commissioners; but the cynical cheerfulness with which they pursued their work of dissolution and suppression might have pleaded its justification in the notorious incapacity of the ordinary methods of visitation after centuries to effect substantial reform.

Professor F. M. Powicke's *The Reformation in England* (Oxford University Press, 6s.) takes up the story also from the stand-

point of an expert student of medieval ecclesiastical history; and the chief interest of his survey lies in its careful study of constitutional aspects of the Reformation. He emphasizes the inherited element of compromise and the strong position of the Crown. His sketches of individuals such as Thomas More, Stephen Gardiner, Cranmer, and Pole are particularly valuable; and, within the limits which he has set himself, no more illuminating and useful study of the subject has been written. Theological and liturgical changes receive little attention of set purpose; and perhaps insufficient emphasis is given to the point upon which Figgis was wont to insist, that the Reformation was not the irruption of an alien authority *ab extra* into the Church but the assertion of the rights of the laity. Difference of opinion about the Tudor theory of the royal supremacy and the position of Convocation may be permitted; but it is much to be welcomed that Professor Powicke's essay has been rescued from the indifferent company which it formerly kept in a composite volume and has been published separately.

From the Reformation to the Counter-Reformation is a short and easy step. Unfortunately, the exigencies of war prevented the full-scale history of the Jesuits planned in celebration of their quatercentenary from being published. But the single volume of Fr James Brodrick, *The Origin of the Jesuits* (Longmans, 10s. 6d.), is an admirable and authoritative survey, and a stimulating *apéritif* for the greater work to follow. As its title indicates, it traces the foundation and development of the Order during its founder's lifetime, embracing the East no less than Europe. It is based on the most recent authorities, and corrects some misconceptions. For example, it is pointed out that

> in the earliest sketches of the Jesuit Constitutions, provision is made only for the teaching of Christian doctrine to children and for colleges in which young aspirants to the Order might be trained.

Consequently:

> Gandia marked a fateful change, inasmuch as the Jesuits there embarked on the education of lay pupils side by side with their own young brethren.

From a perusal of this study it is evident how truly the Counter-Reformation was a reformation within the Roman Church, and how much its success owed to the Society of Jesus.

Between a history of the Jesuit Order and the growth of toleration there might seem to exist only the relation of contradiction. Professor W. K. Jordan's *The Development of Religious Toleration in England, 1640-1660* (Allen and Unwin, 21s.), is the fourth and final volume of his massive study of the growth of the idea of toleration in this country from the Reformation to the Restoration. It is characterized, as its predecessors were, by an encyclopedic knowledge and by a fairness and fulness of quotation and presentation which are a model for such enterprises. The only regret is that the author has chosen to terminate

his study in 1660. A further volume completing the story down to the Toleration Act of 1689, or even carrying forward the narrative to the Hanoverian accession, which established what had been hardly won in 1689, would have rounded off the history more satisfactorily. The present survey defies review; for only by careful and thorough reading does it yield a full appreciation of its contents. Anglican readers will observe with pleasure the justice done to exponents of toleration among their predecessors, not only in the Cambridge Platonists but in such typical Carolines as Fuller, Jeremy Taylor, and Bramhall. In his previous volume Dr Jordan observed that the Laudian school had ideas of toleration to which their Puritan adversaries have done scant justice.

Toleration historically was achieved as a *pis aller* to Comprehension; and in the eighteenth century also the Methodist revival presented acute problems of comprehension. Probably few, if any, English religious movements have been so thoroughly explored and written up as Methodism. Dr T. B. Shepherd, in *Methodism and the Literature of the Eighteenth Century* (Epworth Press, 10s. 6d.), has elected to explore a field which has not attracted investigators so much. One of the chief achievements of Methodism was the creation of a new reading public and therewith of a demand for religious literature. The contribution of the movement to literature was largely designed to meet this need, and Dr Shepherd does not claim that Methodism influenced largely the literary movements of the epoch, nor the Romantic revival. He presents a careful and detailed study of John Wesley's Journals and Letters, of the other writings, both prose and verse, of the Wesley brothers, and of other of their preachers. He has an interesting chapter on Methodists and the theatre; and his volume is an interesting and useful contribution, not only to the history of Methodism, but also to the social history of England in the eighteenth century.

Conditions of war have frustrated the intended celebration in 1941 of the centenary of the Colonial Bishoprics Fund, founded on June 1, 1841. A slender pamphlet, *The Overseas Episcopate : Centenary History of the Colonial Bishoprics Fund*, by W. F. France (1s., from the Colonial Bishoprics Fund), is a reminder of the extent and importance of the work undertaken in this field by our Church. Despite its brevity, the sketch is informative and contains interesting details. It is adequate within its limits, save in its introductory chapter, which misrepresents the eighteenth century and seems unaware that Anglican episcopacy was established in the United States of America at an earlier date than the Roman Catholics of that sphere and the West Indies received an episcopate.

The publication of a revised edition of L. P. Qualben's *A History of the Christian Church* (Nelson and Sons, 12s. 6d.), in which Christian history is summarized from the apostolic age

to 1936 in 630 pages, is a reminder that G.O.E. still requires similar stupendous efforts from its candidates in Church history. The volume is designed for examination purposes, and possesses both the virtues and vices of its kind. It contains review questions at the end of each chapter, topics for special study, and select bibliographies (in which the initials of recommended authors should be provided), and its text embraces a remarkable number of names, events and dates.

N. Sykes.

Oxford.

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AND THE G.O.E.

For a good many years, among those who plan the training of the future clergy, there has been a conviction that some kind of serious introduction to the science and art of religious education must be provided in the studies of those to be ordained. If action has been delayed, and seems even yet far off, the delay becomes understandable as soon as a ground-plan of such studies is attempted. The experimenter finds that the preliminary clearing of the site has never been attempted (for there seems to be no literature of the subject in English), and the work of levelling has to be attacked before the line of the foundations can be laid out. The following is submitted as the tentative thinking aloud of one amateur surveyor, groping a way towards a provisional ground-plan, which may serve as an outline of what is required by the ordinand.

As we stand on the site it looks as though we can safely drive in at least one peg, bearing the label "education." That is bound to be the starting-point, since our ultimate study of religious education will have its place in the study of education as a whole. But what does education imply? What do we want the ordinand, who has enjoyed the fruits of education in his own youth, to understand by the term, as used by a future educator? There must be somewhere a philosophy of education, which will face the questions of what it is about, whether it corresponds with reality, and whether it is worth while. Most of us, if we are not trained philosophers, find our readiest approach to such philosophical questions in historical studies that tell us of man's attempted solutions. Does not this mean a beginning with the history of the educational idea? What is this business of education, as man's experience has come to grips with it? "Education is what is left, when you have forgotten all that you have learned," says the pregnant aphorism. Mill's famous sentence described it as "the culture which each generation purposely gives to those who are to be its successors, in order to qualify them for at least keeping up, and, if possible, for raising, the level of the improvement which has been attained." How has this actually been worked out on the Greek, Roman, and Christian foundations in the tradition of

European education? What place has it had in a civilized, and perhaps Christian, sociology? How far is the future of mankind involved in its education? The student would find some of the answers to his questions in such a book as Boyd's *History of Western Education*. If he is to be limited (let us hope that he would not be) to definitely small books, there are excellent introductions in Wodehouse's *History of Education*, to be read with Rusk's *Doctrine of the Great Educators*. Can we provisionally agree that at this point our start is to be made? The student would begin to get his perspective. He would know at the outset that religious education did not mean primarily controversy about denominational schools or short cuts in Sunday-school method. As to the claims of this study on the time of the student and teaching staff, a minimum of twelve lectures would be required for a brief sketch. Not less than a weekly lecture throughout the college year would provide adequately.

Where shall our second peg stand? The student of history very soon finds that psychology creeps in. What is this learning process with which all education is concerned? What is the mysterious thing that takes place inside me, when I try to learn Hebrew or how to fly an aeroplane? What has happened inside the child to whom I have explained his Baptism? How, in fact, does any human being learn from another? Unless we face these questions, we are like the driver of a car who has not tackled the workings of an internal-combustion engine. It is not only the psychology of the child, but equally the psychology of the teacher. And the "child," in a teaching Church, may well be the middle-aged member of an adult study group, or the person who brings an adult's problems to his preparation for Confirmation. It is not only the psychology of the classroom. It may be the psychology of the pulpit, if the pulpit is to be used as a place of teaching, as presumably the student will wish to use it. Does it not look as though our second peg will have to be a psychology of education? Certain books occur, such as Sir Percy Nunn's *Education : Its Data and First Principles*, Kennedy Fraser's *Psychology of Education*, and Strayer and Norsworthy's *How to Teach*. Can we, however, stop at this point and leave psychology? The time spent in reading or lectures will have been considerable, and not less than half of that required for our first peg. But the student will find the science of psychology reaching out towards its art. He will see that the view of the teacher and taught was bound to result in certain methods of teaching, that, in fact, psychology has introduced him to practical pedagogy. And this pedagogy he will have learned to approach not as the account of certain profitable tricks or devices to be used in the classroom, in imitation of successful teachers, but as proceeding from reasoned convictions about the teacher and the taught. He will be ready to consider what teachers do, because he has first put himself in a position to

understand why they do it. He will be ready for "practice" because he has learned "principles." Books that would belong naturally to this stage of study are Welton's *Principles and Methods of Teaching*, Sir John Adams's *The New Teaching*, and above all the remarkable series of handbooks, scholarly and exhaustive, in which the Board of Education has described the origins and scope of education in all types of school under its charge (*The Primary School*, *The Junior School*, etc.).

The demands upon time must be serious. Our second and third pegs, between them, would require something like a weekly lecture throughout the college year. Perhaps, if supplementary vacation reading were provided, it might be possible for the work already described to be covered in the course of one year with one weekly lecture, but that is not certain, and much wise compression would be needed. If so, the first term might be given to the history of education, the second to the psychology, and the third to method. Concurrently the student would require practical experience in a day school for at least one hour every other week, so that he might see the teachers at work and the children in action.

At the beginning of his second, and final, year in the theological college, our student is now in this position: he has become fairly well cognizant of the history and theory of education, up to a standard not far short of that of the teacher in the training college, and he has also had some practical experience. But he has not yet touched the distinctive problems of religious education. That is to be the work of his second year, in which he will expect to apply the canons of study carried over from the first year. But here, as we hope to stake out the fourth and following pegs of our ground-plan, we find ourselves in this considerable difficulty, that we are approaching a study which is still without its literature. We should like peg number four to be a history of religious education. How has the Church done its teaching work for nearly twenty centuries? What was the teaching work of the Church, as shown in Old Testament and later in the New? What happened in the apostolic age? What was the catechumenate, and how did the creeds arise in that connexion? What can we learn from the catechetical schools at Alexandria and Jerusalem? What has St Augustine to tell us in the *De catechizandis rudibus* and what can we gather from St Cyril's catechetical lectures? What did St Augustine try to teach at Canterbury to his boys? What happened at the classes in the monastery schools? If there was a tradition of religious education in the Middle Ages, what was it? What was the upshot of the inquiry into religious education that dominated the catechisms of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries? What, in short, carrying the inquiry forward to present times, is the pedigree of our English religious education? Where, if at all, have we left the high-road? Or was there ever a high-road?

At this stage of inquiry we make the astounding discovery that no such history, or anything resembling it, has been written. A few, a very few books, deal with certain periods. Such books are Dr Hodgson's *Primitive Christian Education*, Drane's *Christian Schools and Scholars*, and Kinloch's *Pioneers of Religious Education*. But no history of religious education (nor even an introduction to the subject) has yet appeared in English. The student will have to rely on his lecturer's researches, and the lecturer will have to gather his material in a pioneer review of Church history made for this purpose.

We may presume that this historical review of religious education would occupy the first term of the second year. The second term, on the analogy of the first year's work, would be given to the psychology of religious education. What is the psychology of religious education? Is there a religious instinct to which we can appeal? Or, if we must instead posit a religious sentiment, how is that sentiment acquired and built up? Is there a religious consciousness, and what is it like? What psychological considerations are involved in prayer and worship? How far are the facts of sin and forgiveness to be brought within the comprehension of children? How is the group mind to be related to a sense of religious community? What are the bearings of psycho-analytic psychology upon the problems of conduct in children? In what ways can psychology guide the teaching approach of the religious educator? These, with many other kindred considerations, are problems that await the student and his lecturer. And once again the bookshelves are almost bare. A grateful Church will seize every opportunity to acknowledge the pioneer work done by the Sunday-school reformers in the first thirty years of this century, for to them was given a vision denied to others in the field of religious education. Many of the unpretentious introductions to the psychology of religious teaching, which they published for unlearned teachers, were the work of those who might have attempted far more ambitious work, if the clergy had been ready for it. As things were they wrote perforce for the unlearned, in the academic sense of that term, and they did not produce the work that can be set beside the classic works in the libraries of "secular" psychological inquiry. "Though the religion of children has been a subject of investigation for many years," said Dr Selbie, in his *Psychology of Religion*, "it cannot be said that we have any accurate or scientific knowledge regarding it." What is needed, and what indeed any general study of the subject would evoke, would be a literature relating the findings of such books as Pratt's *Religious Consciousness* and Thouless's *Psychology of Religion* to the explicit problems of religious teaching. Work on these lines has been done recently by Professor Pierre Bovet in *The Child's Religion* and by Dr Yeaxlee in his notable *Religion and the Growing Mind*, but no conspectus

of the subject has yet appeared, and the lecturer would have to construct his own.

The analogy of the first year would suggest that the last term would be occupied with a consideration of methods of religious teaching, both for children and adults, proceeding from the special study of the previous term. Here once more the literature of the subject awaits its authors. Two notable books by Roman Catholics—Bandas's *Religious Instruction and Education* and McMahon's *Some Methods of Teaching Religion*—break new ground in the scholarly consideration of method. G. L. Heawood's *Religion in School* surveys both matter and method as they concern the secondary school, and contains much else that concerns all serious students of religious education. The present writer may ask leave to record his attempt, in *Religious Instruction in the Elementary School*, to provide for the clergy and training-college students a handbook of matter and method within the limits of such schools. The Church may well be proud that Mrs Holland (Miss Hetty Lee) and Miss Phyllis Dent were quick to see the possibilities of Froebel and Montessori methods, and later the " Project " methods, in the teaching of religion, and indeed to have seen them before many teachers in " secular " subjects had acclimatized them to the English school. Yet the fact remains, when the catalogue of acknowledgments is completed, that most of the work for the clergy of the future waits to be done. Out of the extant material, and from all that awaits him in the method books of " secular " education, the lecturer would have the task of collecting the things that it most concerns the ordinand to know, both for the teaching of children and for the adult education that will be urgent in a post-war Church.

Throughout the second year the student will have continued his study of the schools at work. It might be wise that in the first year he should watch and practise the teaching of " secular " subjects and in the second year confine himself to religious instruction. The claim upon his time will have comprised a weekly lecture, a fortnightly teaching practice, and such private study as the lectures have indicated. Is it possible that those who plan his studies may regard such time as a first charge upon his preparation? That will eventually depend on their view of his ministry. In the past it has been a preparation for *kerygma* and the ministry of *didache* has yet to be explored. How far *kerygma* can do its work without *didache*, and how far the teaching mission of our Lord in His own Person, and His own teaching command on Ascension Day, require the training of teaching priests and deacons, are questions beyond the scope of the present inquiry. But it may be supposed that the answers to such questions will eventually decide those in authority whether religious education is to be on the circumference or at the centre of an ordinand's preparation for his work.

CHISLEHURST. J. R. LUMB.

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

DEAR SIR,

The following extracts from a Review of Religious Publications in the *Evangelical Magazine*, December, 1803, and Supplement (vol. xi, pp. 543-4, 589-90) may be of interest at the present time.

Yours very truly,

CORPUS CHRISTI COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

CHARLES SMYTH.

FAST SERMONS.

A Discourse *delivered at the Drum-Head, on the Fort at Margate, Oct.* 19, 1803, *the Day of the General Fast, before the Volunteers, commanded by the Right Hon. W. Pitt. Delivered also before the Ministers, &c. of the East Kent Association, at Folkstone, Oct.* 26; *and, on Nov.* 13, 1803, *to the Volunteers of Southwark, &c. assembled with the Author's own Congregation. By* J. Rippon, D.D. *Published at Request.* 8*vo*, 1*s*.

This discourse is founded on a text, which we earnestly wish may be duly regarded by all our brethren in arms, Deut. xxiii. 9. "When the host goeth forth against thine enemies, then keep thee from every wicked thing." After a suitable introduction, in which the preacher carefully distinguishes between *offensive* and *defensive* war, he proceeds to state the following inquiry:—"How should a people behave when they are going to war?" His answer contains several particulars. 1. They should avoid rashness and inconsideration;—2. They should keep themselves from a prayerless condition;—3. They should preserve themselves from presumption;—and, 4. From despair. Each of these is considerably amplified, and enlivened with anecdotes. . . . Under the second head, the author proposes to the soldiers a short prayer, suited to their use when marching to battle. When this was pronounced, we are informed, all the military men uncovered their heads, and behaved with peculiar reverence. —Among the reasons advanced by the preacher, why we should not despair, he insists on the character of the enemy, which is depicted in the most frightful colours. Col. Wilson's testimony concerning the cruelty of Bonaparte, in murdering 3800 of his prisoners, and in poisoning 580 of his sick troops, is brought forward: to which the author adds a circumstance, related by Dr Witman, in his Travels in Turkey, who says, "That Bonaparte threatened the priests at Jerusalem, That if ever he should obtain possession of that city, he would plant the tree of liberty on the very spot on which the cross of Jesus stood;

and would bury the first French grenadier, who should fall in the attack, in the tomb of our Saviour.—When I recollect this profanity," he adds, " I will not despair."—The Sermon concludes with an affectionate and faithful Address to the Volunteers, on the concerns of their own souls.

Danger announced, and Deliverance sought from God; *or the Conduct of Jehoshaphat and his People exemplified in Britain and her King, preached at Hull. By* G. Lambert. 8*vo*, 1*s*.

Mr Lambert's Discourse is founded upon 2 Chron. xx. 2-4; and the preacher's design is explained in the title of his Sermon. In the prosecution of his text, he considers, 1. The invasion of Judah, in the reign of Jehoshaphat;—2. His conduct on the occasion;—and, 3. The spirit of attachment and unanimity discovered by his people. These particulars are very suitably applied to our own situation and circumstances in the present important crisis.

The Triumph of Piety over Invasion, *preached at West Cowes. By* John Styles. 8*vo*, 6*d*.

The text of this Discourse is the same as the preceding; the division and the application similar. The style is animated; but, as often happens with young authors, in some parts inflated.

A Sermon *preached at the Parish-Church of St. Mary, Rotherhithe. By the Rev.* John Middleton, B.D., *Curate, &c.* 4*to*., 1*s*.

Mr Middleton, from Prov. xxi. 31, considers the time of danger and the means of safety, which are properly explained, on Evangelical principles.

The Sentiments proper to the Present Crisis, *preached at Bristol. By* R[obert] Hall, A.M. 8*vo*, 1*s*. 6*d*.

. . . Mr Hall selects Jer. viii. 6, as a passage very appropriate to the occasion; and, considering the principle of the divine government the same with respect to Britain as to Israel, he endeavours to rectify several mistakes, too commonly adopted; and to cultivate more proper sentiments. Here he reproves, 1. Those who trace national judgments to natural causes only;—2. Those who repose only on an arm of flesh;—3. Those who indulge in wanton and indiscriminate censure of our rulers;—4. Those who rely on our supposed superiority in virtue to our enemies;—5. Those who rest in general lamentations of the corruptions of the age. After rectifying these mistakes, the author points out the peculiar duties of the times; namely, Humiliation, confession, and a return to the faith, as well as the

obedience, of the gospel; from both of which we have most awfully departed.

Did our room permit, there is no part of the present discourse which would not furnish an interesting extract; but we shall advert to one passage only, recommending the whole to the perusal of our readers. Some of Mr Hall's brethren have drawn comfort in the present crisis, from comparing our moral character with the far worse qualities of our enemies. . . . Mr Hall observes, that "Such a conduct betrays inattention to the actual conduct of Providence. Wherever there is conscious guilt, there is room to apprehend punishment; nor is it for the criminal to decide where the merited punishment shall first fall. Judgment often begins at the house of God; and he frequently chastises his servants with severity, before he proceeds to the destruction of his enemies." Instances are given in the History of the Egyptians and the Assyrians.

SHORT NOTICE

Memories of the Supernatural, by Fr W. H. G. Holmes (Mowbrays, 5s.), contains a number of accounts of episodes of each of which the author suggests that the direct intervention of the supernatural is a possible explanation, and on the whole the most probable. They vary in kind from what may be called purely spiritual compulsions to those involving directly material means; from an Indian terrorist who became a Christian and confessed to a crime of which he had been found innocent to a priest who picked up a sovereign in the street and was able to restore it to its needy owner.

Fr Holmes encourages the reader by refusing to draw rash deductions; in the one case where he seems to do so he is, I think, mistaken. No vision of the future can possibly disprove mechanical causation in the universe. If it proved anything, which it does not, it would tend to prove the opposite. But it is, in fact, not with this kind of proof that these stories are concerned. They are authentic, in the sense that we must take the author's word for them; and if we accept a universe in which such things may happen, and if we accept the interpretation of them here suggested, then the energy of that universe is exhibited by them in its proper operation. It is in this sense that they are gravely convincing; one derives from them a sense of power at work. "Anything may happen at any moment"; it is strictly in accord with such a power that one is enabled to say of it "anything". But the fruit is always good.

CHARLES WILLIAMS.

OXFORD.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE HIGH CHURCH TRADITION. A Study in the Liturgical Thought of the Seventeenth Century. By G. W. O. Addleshaw. Faber and Faber. 7s. 6d.

One of the most vital problems confronting those who are thinking constructively about the future of English religion lies in the present position and future development of the Catholic tradition in the Church of England; and Mr Addleshaw's book makes a valuable contribution to the discussion. At the close of the last war the Anglo-Catholic Congress of 1920 revealed a movement which, after two generations of obloquy and misunderstanding, was now able to show a remarkable harvest in unity of witness, in universality of range, and in evangelical power. The movement had the support, moreover, of a number of eminent theologians, young men as well as veterans, among whom were several laymen, well known in academic and other spheres. And during the next decade it attracted widespread interest and sympathetic attention among leading religious thinkers and writers in France, Sweden, North America, and the Balkan states. Since 1930, however, there has been some change in the position, and it calls for consideration. It is not that those who were seeking to live the Catholic life and to teach the Catholic faith were changing their minds or their allegiance: there were no appreciable transfers to other schools of thought, and no lapsings to Rome comparable with those which marked the Victorian age. Nor has there been any lack of men and women of distinction in life and letters to bear testimony to the vitality of the tradition. We might describe the position, perhaps, by saying that the structure had become top-heavy, and that its growth had come to reveal strains and frictions lower down which had not been foreseen. They were more practical than theological, matters of policy rather than of doctrine. But none the less they concerned principles, and principles which were of special interest to the ordinary parishioner. By what authority were men acting? Was it Anglican or Roman, or a kind of amalgam of the two? What principles lay behind apparent deviations from the accustomed rites of the Church of England, and the introduction of ceremonies hitherto unfamiliar? The questions were not new; but the success and publicity of the movement, and a certain impatience which was its psychological fruit, made them more widely and more earnestly asked.

At the same time there were many other things afoot, both within the Church and outside it, which bore on these problems. Serious efforts were made by the leaders of the Church to integrate many of the ideals and aims of the movement with

the Church's general life, both through the appointment of High Churchmen to responsible positions and through a widening of the law of public worship. Nor did the refusal of Parliament to give legislative sanction to the 1928 Book seriously impair this process; the decision of the episcopate to accept the Book as a working basis for administration in liturgical matters would have met the case, had the Book itself been more widely acceptable as an instrument of harmony and peace. Nevertheless, even so, much was done to indicate how the liturgical pattern of the seventeenth century might be modified, widened and enriched to make room for the changed conditions of the twentieth, and, whatever the eventual issue, that work will not have been wasted. But before such an issue can be reached the question of the Church of England's authority, and its claim on the Catholic as well as on the Evangelical elements in Anglicanism, will have to be answered: we must know where we stand in regard both to Rome and to whatever is the modern counterpart of Geneva.

Meanwhile there have been changes in the religious life of the country generally of which note must be taken. Among the chief of these is the extent to which the Nonconformist bodies have become organized "Churches," with settled standards of procedure, regular financial arrangements, and a growing appreciation of the value of liturgical form in worship. Their theologians, moreover, stand side by side with our own in the exposition of the New Testament and in the defence and confirmation of the Gospel. These are facts of great importance when we reflect on the wide vogue of a soft sentimentalism and a wordy worship which are still a constant danger to English and American Christianity. Anglicanism and Nonconformity are pursuing converse processes, the former seeking to adapt its settled creed and liturgy to the needs of those who think that a new prayer is *ipso facto* somehow better than an old one, and the latter trying to lead those who have been won to Christ by free and unconventional methods into the rich heritage of Church membership and to show them what opportunities of edification are opened up by the well-tried principles of Common Prayer.

Set against this background of problems, dangers and hopes, Mr Addleshaw's compact and learned study of the seventeenth-century divines has much that is valuable to offer. "High Churchmanship," he says, "still has something to teach us. Its contribution to the Church of England is an emphasis on the wholeness of Christianity; that the dogma, the prayer, and the life are a living whole, which expresses itself in the liturgy." That is finely put, and the thesis is sustained throughout the volume. Specially forcible is Mr Addleshaw's exposition of the doctrine of authority underlying the group of theologians he is considering, and its contrast to "the artificiality of the Roman view"; his emphasis on the mutual interpenetration of the

Church and society which accounts for and justifies the Church's "established" position; his picture of Doctors' Commons and the training in the traditions of ecclesiastical law which it imparted and guaranteed; his insistence that "objective worship" (to use W. B. Pratt's term) was and is wholly compatible with the principle of edification. And not least important is what Mr Addleshaw has to say as to the close connexion between the Eucharist and the Cross which characterized Caroline teaching. "The Eucharist does not take the place of Calvary, it does not commemorate Calvary as a past event. The seventeenth-century High Churchmen love the Eucharistic sacrifice because they love the Cross. . . . By propitiation they mean the application of Calvary, now made present in all its power and efficacy. Cosin speaks of it as bringing into act the propitiation made by Christ, and applying it and rendering it beneficial to the living and dead and all true members of the Catholic Church." It is no far cry from this teaching to that of Père de la Taille, and of Sir Will Spens in *Essays Catholic and Critical*, in modern times.

Finally, Mr Addleshaw has some striking things to say about the "sociological significance" of the Eucharist, based on the text, "There cannot be a perfect and complete adoration to God in our devotions, unless there be also doing good and distributing to our neighbours." No one writes from better practical knowledge and experience on this point than our author, who has studied the Jocist movement in France and Belgium so thoroughly and made it so inspiring to his fellow-Churchmen at home. I suspect that the appeal of the Eucharist in coming years will more and more lie in its close association with the Cross and in the effectual promise it gives of the consecration of work. But enough has been said to commend this volume to those who are thinking about these things. Naturally, more must not be asked of it than it offers to supply. The liturgical interest fills the canvas: the great work of Jeremy Taylor and to a lesser extent of Bishop Sanderson in moral theology receives little attention; and the excellences of the Prayer Book are dwelt on almost to the exclusion of its limitations and defects. Perhaps this is inevitable in view of the Non-Jurors' secession, which cut short as with a knife the natural fruitage of the Caroline movement, so that we can discern its full results only by seeing them sprout here and there in other and often very different fields. But we may safely say that when that great calamity in English Church history has been outlived, and when the Lord of the harvest comes to gather in to one reunited Christendom the corn which He has sown, the tradition set forth with so much power by the seventeenth-century divines, and embodied in the Book of Common Prayer, will bulk large among the bundles that fill the golden granary of God.

E. G. Selwyn.

Winchester.

A Plain Man's Life of Christ. By A. D. Martin. Allen and Unwin. 8s. 6d.

In this posthumous work Mr Martin has attempted to see the Life from a fresh point of view, and to write not for the student but for the "wayfaring man." The student may, however, be permitted to offer a few comments.

1. Mr Martin's use of the Gospel sources is a compromise between following St Mark as a straightforward historical biography (*à la* Burkitt) and making a selection from the Synoptic Gospels of particularly significant incidents or sayings (*cp.* St John's "signs"). Much of the framework is held together by an extensive use of "historical imagination," which also is given embarrassingly free rein on such passages as Mark xiv, 3-9. (He did not see that his being forced to rely on imagination in order to produce a "Life" at all is the strongest argument for the truth of the main contentions of the Form-Critics; for the Gospels themselves protest at such a process of supplementation. But if he was born too soon to find more than "interesting conjectures" in Form-Criticism, he was at least saved from Proto-Luke.)

2. He promises in the Preface to treat particularly of our Lord's poetry, but in *c.* 5, after a quaint discussion of rhythm in the Cosmos, he merely uses Burney's theory that the original Aramaic of the Parable of the Sheep and the Goats was in rhyme in order to support his "instinct" that our Lord cannot have intended "Depart from me . . ." as a literal possibility. The long digression in *c.* 6 on the theological use of "Father" is also rather unsuccessful.

3. The author seems to have been in partial reaction from a "Liberal" background. Thus he will not have the dogmatic scepticism of C. XIX with regard to the Gospel miracles. But his own attitude (apart from occasional rationalism—*e.g.*, p. 214, on the Virgin Birth) is one of credulity as to the possible achievements of "persons of a certain exalted spirituality" or "charismatic men" (*c.* 4).

4. His main idiosyncrasies, however, arise from a tacit rejection of the categories of nature and supernature which involves him in near-Pantheism: *cp.* especially a passage on the Kingdom of God (p. 114-5), which incidentally bears very little relation to anything in the Gospels. This also forms the basis of his view of the Christ as the product of a further evolutionary leap (Eo-anthropus—→Neanderthal Man—→Homo Sapiens—→"Homo Sanctus"): a view which is not likely to commend itself to biologists, since biological evolution apparently only involves new psychological (and spiritual?) characteristics in strict dependence on physical changes (*e.g.*, a larger brain); and the sacred humanity was certainly normal (Heb. ii, 17).

Will this help the Plain Man? I doubt it: for the issue of

faith or unbelief is left hopelessly obscure. As regards the work of Christ, Mark x, 45 and xiv, 24 are accepted and yet the death is spoken of as a martyrdom (p. 209). And what sense can there possibly be in a being who at once is a product of an evolutionary process (even if providentially directed) and at the same time claims to forgive sins uniquely (p. 96), accepts divine honours (p. 134), and demands personal faith in himself (p. 106)?

J. D. M. Stuart.

Oxford.

In His Image: A Study of Man's Relation to God. By Bede Frost. Mowbrays. 8s. 6d.

The Christian doctrine of man has rightly been given a new prominence in recent theology, since the consequences of its rejection have been made plain to us. So it is useful to have this book by Fr Bede Frost, who presents the doctrine that man is made in the image of God from a point of view which all who value historic theology must respect. His method is that of traditional scholasticism; and he illustrates both the strength of scholasticism—its determined use of reason, and also its weakness—that straining after technically precise formulæ in a subject-matter that constantly makes the formulæ sound pinched and pedantically thin. "What is a virtue? It is an inner principle added to a faculty in order to dispose or determine that faculty to a certain mode of acting" (p. 148). Bloodless categories, indeed!

The book is for the most part a clear and informative statement, though it is tightly packed and rather laborious, with little to mitigate the heaviness of its textbook manner and its often clumsy style. Fr Frost ploughs his way through the theological sea with a serene and unbounded confidence in his scholastic charts. He is quite content with the medieval theologians (whom he credits with a much wider knowledge of Holy Scripture than Christian teachers to-day) and with their Roman Catholic successors; apart from these, he seems to find nothing but various forms and degrees of error, due to "the inversion of Christian truths and values which dates from the sixteenth century." Scholasticism is intellectualist, formal and schematic; and Fr Frost adopts this manner with a pugnacious ardour. His book has a cut-and-dried quality, as of a theological herbarium, in which rather more than all that is known of God and man is securely labelled. There is little attempt to persuade, hardly any examination of other views, and much positive affirmation. The faculty-psychology is adopted without a tremor. Brushing aside the "weakness, vagueness and imprecision" of modern theological writing, Fr Frost sends us back to St Thomas's Aristotelianism, telling us oddly that the

Christian Faith " repeats Aristotle " about God. In expounding the Thomistic teleology (all things tend towards their proper perfection) he says nothing of the apparent cruelty, selfishness, and waste of the animal creation. Among other things, the Roman view of justification, of merit *de condigno* and *de congruo*, and of faith, is fully accepted. Any other views are apparently unworthy of consideration; and, of course, Luther and Calvin are mentioned only to be dismissed very curtly.

Certainly, since he is expounding a great tradition, Fr Bede Frost says much that is valuable and necessary in any modern statement of the Christian doctrine of man. There is, for instance, a very interesting analysis, derived from St Augustine's *De Trinitate*, of what is meant by saying that man is made in the " image " of God. But it seems to us that the *philosophia perennis* needs to be translated into a more inviting idiom and handled in a more judicious spirit if it is to speak effectively to our condition.

H. Balmforth.

Ely.

Forgiveness and Reconciliation: A Study in New Testament Theology. By Vincent Taylor. Macmillan. 10s. 6d.

This book completes a trilogy, and those who have read the earlier volumes, *Jesus and His Sacrifice* and *The Atonement in New Testament Theology*, will need no encouragement to read this one too. In it Dr Taylor makes an exhaustive study of the content of the terms forgiveness, justification, reconciliation, fellowship and sanctification in the New Testament, and shows very clearly that they are not synonymous. Then he shows how each of them is related to the fact of the Atonement. It is a masterly and beautiful book, rather more difficult than its predecessors but even more worth while. One's only regret is that it does not contain an equally exhaustive study of the group of Hebrew words— *ṣedeq*, *ṣaddiq*, etc.—which convey the ideas of righteousness and justification in the Old Testament and so provide the basis for the New. If this could be supplied in a second edition, the work would be monumental. But even without that, it is a book which one feels it is impertinent to praise, though it is difficult to find words in which to describe its supreme quality. There is a story told of one of the great German theologians—I rather think it was Delitzsch, but am not sure. One of his disciples was so struck by his spirituality that he concealed himself one evening in his study, hoping thereby to learn the secret of his prayer. The scholar came in and sat down to work. Hour after hour passed, with no sound save the turning of leaves and the scratch of his pen. The pupil's expectation that the master would pass the night upon his knees was disappointed; and he began to wonder where the prayer came in. Then,

sotto voce, as to a Friend all along beside him, the old man said, "*Dear* Lord Jesus!" This book was written in the same companionship.

Sunt qui scire volunt, eo fine tantum, ut sciant;
et turpis curiositas est:
Et sunt qui scire volunt, ut sciantur ipsi;
et turpis vanitas est:
Et sunt item qui scire volunt, ut scientiam suam vendant;
verbi causa, pro pecunia, pro honoribus;
et turpis quæstus est.
Sed sunt quoque qui scire volunt, ut ædificent;
et charitas est.
Et item qui scire volunt, ut ædificentur:
et prudentia est.
Nec enim potes aut amare quem nescias,
aut habere quem non amaveris.
Noveris proinde te ut Deum timeas;
noveris ipsum ut æque ipsum diligas.
In altero initiaris ad sapientiam,
in altero et consummaris.

St Bernard, *In Cantica Sermones*.

WANTAGE. A MEMBER OF C.S.M.V.

POLITICAL LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE CONCEPTION IN THE MIDDLE AGES AND MODERN TIMES. By A. J. Carlyle. Clarendon Press. 12s. 6d.

The appearance of this study by the joint author, with his brother, of the *History of Medieval Political Theory*, which has won acceptance as a classic, is an event of great importance. It is a masterly exposition of the history of the conception of political liberty in medieval and modern times, and it takes into account, as well as the question of political freedom, the question of the relation of the authority of the political society to the individual, which must inevitably be at the back of the reader's mind in his study of these pages.

Dr Carlyle's thesis is that the pursuit of political liberty is in the main line of historical development in our Western civilization, interrupted only by a phase of absolutism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which "fell to pieces under the weight of its inherent absurdity and incompetence." For more than a generation, in the historical schools of our universities, the doctrine has been taught that it is to the Middle Ages that we must go back for the conception of political liberty which seems to most people to be so characteristically modern. It is hard to persuade people that this is the truth, but it is written clearly in the history of political thought.

The man of the Middle Ages knew that all merely human authority is limited by the Law of Nature, which, in so far as

it has not been modified in the concrete circumstances of society, possesses the authority and sanction of God. There is therefore no absolute political authority; and so St Thomas could say that an unjust authority can be resisted. Further, the only immediate source of political authority is the community. Both these principles are derived from Roman law, the theory being that the Roman people transferred their authority to the emperors. But in the Middle Ages it was the law and not the ruler who was supreme; and this law was primarily the custom of the community. " The King is bound to keep, and to cause to be kept, the customs of his country " (Beaumanoir). Or, as Bracton said: " The king has two superiors, God and the law." The king did not himself make or determine the law. If legislation became necessary, it required the co-operation of those who stood for the community. Political liberty in the Middle Ages means primarily the supremacy of law; and the will of the community of which it is an expression is itself expressed by the system of representation, a characteristic invention of the Middle Ages, in accordance with the principle: " Quod omnes tangit, ab omnibus approbetur."

Now this theory, in the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, had to face the theory of the absolute authority of the prince, which gained credit as a reaction against the prevailing disorder, the only remedy for which appeared to be the establishment of an absolute monarchy. *Le nouveau Messie est le roi.* The maxims of Roman law that the prince is the source of law and is also *legibus solutus*, known already in the Middle Ages, came to the forefront again, and the doctrine of the " Divine Right of Kings " reared its head. In Bodin and Barclay, the theory of absolute authority is set out, and James I of England wrote his *True Law of Free Monarchies.*

But what Dr Carlyle is concerned to show is that in spite of this, in spite of Bishop Overall's *Convocation Book*, in spite of Filmer, in spite of Le Bret and Bossuet in France and Hobbes in England, the medieval tradition was never lost or forgotten. Two great thinkers, Hooker and Althusius, consciously looked back to the medieval past and beyond that to the Fathers and to antiquity in their balanced judgments, which asserted that the community was the source of authority in a political society, and that positive law derives its authority from the community. In seventeenth-century France, similar conceptions, rooted in the past, were kept alive by Coquille, Loyseau, and Joly, and later by Jurieu and the illustrious Fénelon; in Spain, by a number of writers such as Saavedra, Molina, Suarez and Mariana; in Holland, somewhat ambiguously by Grotius and more clearly by Gronovius; while in Germany Puffendorf and Leibniz are the most famous names. In seventeenth-century England, after Coke, Prynne, and Milton, we come to Halifax and Locke. The last-named, as Dr Carlyle points out, in his " Second

Treatise " *On Civil Government*, is restating the medieval position, and it is important to realize that, in his obvious concern to defend the liberty of the individual as against the community, he is, in effect, restating the " most fundamental doctrine of the Middle Ages, that all laws, secular or ecclesiastical, which are contrary to the natural law, are, *ipso facto*, null and void."

The eighteenth century was dominated in thought by the English Revolution of 1688 and the American revolt of 1776. Voltaire and Montesquieu were the prophets of political liberty on the English model; and Burke, as Dr Carlyle says, " in his great speeches and letters on the revolt of the American Colonies did more than anyone else in Europe to forward and develop the conception of political liberty."

The French Revolution too " represents the continuity of political principles which can be recognized in the history of the Middle Ages, and in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries." This is seen even in Rousseau's conception of the " General Will," which does not imply an absolute sovereignty of the community; it is seen also in Condorcet, and, emphatically, in Tom Paine.

Dr Carlyle points out that, strangely, it was not until the middle of the eighteenth century, with Major Cartwright, that the demand was really raised that all men should share in electing the representatives of the community, and he discusses the views of Adams and Jefferson on what was to become an all-important question. Finally, he has a penetrating chapter on the relations of economic and political freedom, in which he remarks that real freedom cannot consist in the abolition of restraints. Individual freedom has come in our industrialized society from the intervention of the State and the co-operation and combination of the wage-earners. In the society of the future, control alone can create a rational economic order, and, as Dr Carlyle reminds us, " it is a mere absurdity to think that freedom in economic matters is comparable with the inalienable freedom of the intellectual or moral or artistic life."

F. J. E. Raby.

Harpenden.

Housman, 1897-1936. By Grant Richards. O.U.P. 21s.

A. E. Housman's publisher, Mr Richards, having been the *gratia præveniens* to the literary popularity of the " Shropshire Lad," now becomes its *gratia coronans*. This long study swallows up all previous accounts of Housman and exhaustively anticipates any to come. Mr Richards suffers from the " *Lues Boswelliana*, or disease of admiration " (Macaulay), and has even looked through 1,293 pages of a school prize of his hero to discover two underlinings and two pencilled exclamation marks in the margin. His approach is frankly uncritical, and he

admits that he has " a very good memory " for his " meetings with the great." But he admits he is no scholar himself, and is honest enough to include adverse opinions of A. E. H.'s worth which he can only mutely reject. And his book successfully disposes of any myths of a romantic " Housman enigma," and gives us a kindly and more attractive portrait than usual of the elusive and reticent misogynist.

Mr Richards's achievement, however, only accentuates the sense of incompleteness which the poems already suggest: if there is no major emotional tragedy (other than a failure in Greats), no crisis of pessimism to account for Housman's bitterness, the failure to integrate his life with his poetry, to widen his sensibility to sympathetic proportions, becomes the more disastrous. Within its range " A Shropshire Lad " is a delicately effective and sometimes a beautiful work; the later poems still show the same supremely epigrammatic dexterity—but the same narrowness, and a timidity as if afraid to move beyond the safe, familiar intellectual and social pattern of his youth. By this limitation of sensibility we do not mean only his irreligion —though his atheism goes deeper, of course, than mere witticism, as when he says of the doctrine of the Trinity " probably false, and quite unimportant if true," or talks of a man who " resides in Gloucester Cathedral along with St Peter and Almighty God "; nor only his " objections to the management of the universe," chief of which is that " we suffer so much more from our gentler and more amiable vices than from our darkest crimes "; nor his frank desire for death: " The continuation of my life beyond May 1933 was a regrettable mistake, and the bright side of the weakening of my health since the end of February is that it encourages me to hope for an earlier termination of the affair "; we mean the inner barrenness revealed by the harsh, dry humour of the verse, the melodramatic and often sentimental cynicism, the political and social deafness, and the specialization of his classical scholarship to the exclusion of real interest in current educational issues. It all comes out in his own critical taste, about which this book is very informative: he tried to keep up with modern writing, and was often startlingly perceptive—yet much of his reading was of mere literary gossip, often by writers of no account; and his famous disclosures in the Leslie Stephen lecture show the narrowness of his approach to literature. His judgment of poetry by its effect upon the stomach is parallel to his judgment of food and wine upon the palate. To the latter much of this book is devoted, and the proportion is significant. The malicious would say that the Paris restaurant, the Tour d'Argent, which he so frequented, should have been called the Tour d'Ivoire. There is no indication in Housman's life or letters of an awareness that civilization faced a crisis; in 1919 he wrote: " After my sacrifices for my country during the war I am beginning to spend money on

myself instead of saving it up for the Welsh miners." It is not surprising, then, that a younger generation found his outlook, and therefore his poetry, unhelpful, though Mr Richards seems unaware of the limitation. The book is valuable for rescuing much useful material—including A. E. H.'s illuminating answer to a questionnaire from a Frenchman, various tributes to his genius, especially to his supreme scholarship, and a handy research paper by Professor Fletcher on sources of Housman's poetry. But to those who think his work reminiscent of those attractive and neat gardens made by keen station-masters outside country halts, this compendious biography will seem somewhat smothering praise for what can best be admired from a passing railway-train bound for a very different destination.

MARTIN JARRETT-KERR, *Novice, C.R.*

MIRFIELD.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(*Mention here neither implies nor precludes subsequent comment.*)

BURNS OATES: R. Knox, *In Soft Garments* (6s.).

LONGMANS: *Malvern, 1941 : Proceedings of the Archbishop of York's Conference* (10s. 6d.); M. B. Reckitt and J. V. L. Casserley, *The Vocation of England* (5s.); C. E. Raven, *Lessons of the Prince of Peace* (2s. 6d.).

LUTTERWORTH PRESS: C. J. Cadoux, *The Historic Mission of Jesus* (21s.).

MOWBRAYS: L. Barkway, *The Christian Belief about Christ* (1s. 6d.); W. H. G. Holmes, *Newness of Life* (2s.); A. W. F. Blunt, *The Goodly Fellowship* (4s. 6d.).

PAX HOUSE: E. T. W. Branscombe, *Heavenward Bound* (7s. 6d.).

RICH AND COWAN: L. Dewar and P. Dent, *Training in Worship* (5s.).

S.C.M. PRESS: J. Foster, *Then and Now* (6s.).

S.P.C.K.: L. S. Hunter, *Planning Ahead* (6d.); A. Freeman, *Church Organs and Organ Cases* (1s.).

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